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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The major objective of this study is to identify the effects of land tenure security 
on Small Scale Commercial agricultural productivity and development in 
Zimbabwe. Using a probit model, the study draws the following conclusions: 
i. Under a more secure tenure system, farmers are likely to have some long-
term investments, in this case in plantation crops.  
ii. The type of tenure system may not necessarily influence an investment in 
non-fixed assets like livestock. 
iii. Secure tenure is likely to influence investment in property improvement 
fixed assets such as fencing and woodlots. 
iv. Secure tenure is likely to positively influence an investment in permanent 
housing facilities but does not seem to influence an investment in 
associated infrastructure such as garages, workshops or shades. 
v. Secure tenure seems to be associated with a higher propensity to invest in 
improving existing farm infrastructure.  
vi. Freehold tenure system is associated with a higher propensity to access 
to credit. 
vii. Tenure security appears not to significantly affect medium term soil 
improvements.  Medium-term and long-term investments on the farm do 
not seem to have any significant impact on the level of input use. 
viii. However, contrary to expectations, the results of this study indicate that 
tenure security may not necessarily result in higher productivity. 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
1.1 Background and Significance of Research 
 
The debate on appropriate land tenure systems for smallholder agriculture has been 
going on for quite some time now in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) region.  Smallholder farmers within SADC often attribute the poor 
performance of smallholder agriculture to existing land tenure systems. Most 
smallholder farmer organizations in SADC argue that freehold tenure and adequate 
land are the most important pre-conditions for smallholder agriculture 
commercialization.  Development specialists on the other hand argue that land 
tenure security is a pre-requisite to increased smallholder agricultural productivity 
and development.  Past arguments in favour of statutory, individualized land tenure 
systems (titling) claim that tenure security (1) increases credit use through greater 
incentives for investment, improved creditworthiness of projects, and enhanced 
collateral value of land; (2) increases land transactions, facilitating land transfers 
from less efficient to more efficient users by increasing the certainty of contracts and 
lowering enforcement costs; (3) reduces the incidence of land disputes through 
clearer definition and protection of rights; and (4) raises productivity through 
increased agricultural investment (Feder and Noronha 1987, Barrows and Roth 
1990). 
 
Many development thinkers have attributed the weakened incentives to invest in 
smallholder agriculture to the absence of security of tenure to land ownership (for 
example Rukuni, 2000; Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994; Feder and Noronha 1987).  
Rukuni (2000) argues that the inability of smallholder farmers to use “their” land as 
collateral to borrow the much needed short and long term credit for investment in 
agriculture denies most of them access to technology (hybrid seed, fertilizer, 
equipment etc).  This in turn can lead to low productivity and unsustainable 
practices. Tenure security is considered an important precondition for increasing 
land-based economic development and environmentally sustainable natural resource 
use (Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994).   According to Rukuni (2000) tenure security in 
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as far as an exclusive land right of groups and individuals is concerned, is the very 
basis of economic, political and social power and status. 
   
1.2 Research Question and Objective 
 
Zimbabwe has about 10 000 small-scale commercial (SSC) farmers farming a total 
of 1.2 million hectares.  Farm sizes range from 70 to 500 hectares depending on the 
agro-ecological region. High potential agro-ecological regions will tend to have 
smaller farms practicing intensive agriculture whilst low potential agro-ecological 
regions have relatively larger farms practicing extensive agriculture. The average 
farm size is about 162 hectares of which 10 – 40 hectares are arable.  Fifty-two 
percent of the SSC farms are under leasehold and the balance is under freehold title.   
 
The freehold tenure system is characterized by individual land ownership.  The 
registered farm owner has exclusive property rights and full control and responsibility 
over the land and everything attached to it except to the extent that ownership and 
exclusive control over the land and some natural resources may be limited by 
statutory provisions.  Such limitations relate to changes in land use, control over 
public water courses, felling of indigenous timber resources and controls on wildlife. 
In Zimbabwe, this is the most secure tenure system and it is often argued that it 
provides land owners with the incentives to conserve and improve the natural 
resource base. The leasehold tenure (permit or resettlement) system is an 
agreement between the state, through the Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and 
Resettlement and the Lessee. Land use under leasehold is limited by the purpose of 
the lease and land legislation.  Lease conditions for example may limit stocking 
limits, or land use options.  The system imposes high levels of care on the 
leaseholder and any lease transfers may require State approval.  There are no rights 
to subdivide or aggregate land.  The state retains the power to acquire leases or 
withhold lease when the leasing period expires (Murombedzi and Gomera, 2004).   
 
In the Zimbabwean context, the freehold tenure system is considered the most 
secure tenure system when compared to the leasehold tenure system. Following 
Place and Hazell (1993), tenure security in this study is measured based on whether 
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a farmer has freehold tenure or leasehold tenure to their farm.  With freehold tenure 
(title deeds) the farmer has complete transfer rights (the right to sell the land), 
whereas with the leasehold tenure, the farmer only has use rights. 
 
SSC agriculture in Zimbabwe continues to suffer from low and declining productivity.  
Productivity of SSC agriculture is much lower than its potential. In the 1960's 
productivity levels were nearly as high as the large-scale commercial (LSC) sub-
sector in comparable areas1.  Since then, there has been a gradual decline in 
productivity levels.  Productivity accounts for as little as 3 percent of the annual area 
planted to principal crops.  SSC agriculture is also not diversified and 
commercialized.  On average, these farmers crop about fifty-five percent of their total 
cropped area to maize.   
 
The major objective of this study is to identify the effects of land tenure security on 
SSC agricultural productivity and development in Zimbabwe.   The research question 
for this study is:   
Does land tenure security affect farming systems, organization and 
performance among Zimbabwean small scale commercial farmers, and if 
so, how?  
 
The specific objectives of the study are to: 
 analyze the current state and performance of SSC agriculture; 
 compare farm infrastructure development between freehold tenure and leasehold 
tenure SSC agriculture; 
 assess if there are any differences to credit access for freehold tenure and 
leasehold tenure SSC agriculture; and 
 analyze any productivity differences between freehold tenure and leasehold 
tenure SSC agriculture. 
 
Based on the above objectives, the hypotheses of the study are: 
                                                           
1
 The LSC sub-sector average farm size is 2 223 hectares for private farms and 7 644 hectares for 
state farms and the arable land varies considerably from agro-ecological region to agro-ecological 
region.   
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 Farm infrastructure development is higher for freehold tenure than leasehold 
tenure SSC agriculture.  This is because farmers with more secure land rights 
may have a higher probability of recouping the benefits from land improvements 
and thus will be more inclined to make medium- or long-term land improvements 
and to use complementary yield-increasing inputs 
 Farmers under freehold tenure have better access to credit than those under 
leasehold tenure.   Land ownership security is presumed to enhance capital 
formation by providing better incentives and improved access to credit.  Because 
it implies a greater likelihood of repayment, improved tenure security may also 
increase lender willingness to offer credit, leading to easier financing of farm 
investments and inputs. 
 Farms under freehold tenure have higher productivity than those under leasehold 
tenure. Tenure security may enhance long-term investments, which in turn 
enhance yields.  Tenure security provides farmers with adequate incentives or 
means to make land improvements or adopt new technologies that could 
enhance production efficiency (Parsons, 1971). 
 
The above hypothesis will be measured by exploring the following key research 
issues or questions: 
 
 Does land tenure security affect farm infrastructure development and investment 
amongst SSC farmers in Zimbabwe?   
 Does land tenure security affect SSC farmer’s access to credit? 
 Does land tenure security affect farm productivity amongst SSC farms in 
Zimbabwe?  
 
1.3 Justification for the Research 
 
There is a continuing debate about whether land tenure security is a constraint on 
small scale agricultural productivity in Zimbabwe. This debate has been carried out 
without benefit of rigorous empirical tests of the relationship between different tenure 
systems and agricultural productivity.  The present study uses data from farm 
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surveys to test the relationships through formal econometric modeling. This section 
reviews gaps in literature; highlights the importance of smallholder agriculture in the 
Zimbabwean economy and the potential implications for future land tenure policy in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Gaps in literature  
Although economists argue that full-fledged private property rights enhance 
investment incentives [Demsetz, 1967; Ault and Rutman, 1979; De Alessi, 1980; 
Feder, 1987, 1993; Feder et al., 1988; Feder and Feeny, 1991; Barzel, 1989; 
Lebecap, 1989; Binswanger et al., 1995; Zimmerman and Carter, 1997; Feder and 
Nishio, 1997], in African agriculture, the logic associating higher land tenure security 
and higher incentives to invest has recently been called into question.  Results 
obtained in Burkina Faso cast doubt on the existence of a systematic influence of 
land tenure security on investment (Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau, 2001).  
Brasselle et al. (2001) concluded that the village order, where it exists, provides the 
basic land rights required to stimulate small-scale investment. 
 
Broadly speaking, landowners are expected to be both more willing and more able to 
undertake investment where private property rights prevail.  They are more willing to 
invest for essentially two reasons.  First, when farmers feel more secure in their right 
or ability to maintain long-term use over their land, the return to long-term land 
improvements and conservation measures is higher, and they have therefore a 
greater incentive to undertake investments.  This is the ‘assurance effect’.  Second, 
when land can be more easily converted to liquid assets, superior transfer rights 
have the effect of lowering the costs of exchange if the land is either rented or sold 
and improvements made through investment can be better realized, thereby 
increasing its expected return.  Investment incentives are again enhanced because 
of the ‘realizability effect’.  On the other hand, farmers are more able to invest 
because, when freehold titles are established, land acquires collateral value and 
access to credit is easier.  This ‘collateralisation effect’ is especially important 
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regarding formal lending sources which often have imperfect information on the 
borrower [Feder and Nishio, 1997:5] 
 
Verifying empirically the impact of land tenure security on investment behaviour is a 
more difficult task than what it may appear at first sight.  There is a problem in 
inferring from the existence of a significant relationship between tenure security and 
agricultural investment that causality actually runs from the former to the latter.  In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, some land improvements, particularly the planting of trees, is a 
well-recognized method of enhancing tenure security for holders of temporary or 
fragile claims [see, e.g., Bruce, 1988; Noronha, 1985; Robertson, 1987; Atwood, 
1990; Place and Hazel, 1993; Sjaastad and Bronley, 1997; De Zeeuw, 1997].  Again, 
there exists a two-way relationship between land rights and investment. 
 
So far, only a few studies have actually dealt with the problem of endogenous land 
rights while estimating the effect of tenure security on agricultural investment.  
Besley (1995) re-worked the data collected by the World Bank on Ghana to assess 
the sensitivity of the results to the estimation methodology used.  The conclusion is 
that such sensitivity is considerable since the results have been simply inverted.  
More precisely, while the original World Bank’s study (Migot-Adholla et. al., 1994) 
concluded that tenure security has a clearly positive impact on investment in the 
region of Anloga but less noticeable impact in Wassa (and no impact at all in Ejura), 
Besley’s study reached the opposite conclusion that better land rights facilitate 
investment in Wassa but not in Anloga.   A recent study on 36 villages in central 
Uganda concludes that investment enhances tenure security, yet the converse 
relationship is not true (Baland et al., 1999). 
 
Moor (1996) concluded that tenure security in the form of land titling and registration 
has a significant and positive effect on long-term on-farm investments.  Feder (1987) 
concluded that titling of land has a decisive influence on investment behaviour in 
Thailand.  Hayes, Roth and Zepeda (1997) conclude that secure tenure tends to 
stimulate long-term land improvements and tree planting in Gambia. All these 
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authors failed to control for the endogeneity2 of land rights and so the few studies 
done on African agriculture have given mixed results. This study will contribute to 
existing empirical evidence by specifically looking at the Zimbabwean experience.  It 
will also take into account the problem of endogenous land rights while estimating 
the effect of tenure security on agricultural investment.  
 
The importance of smallholder agriculture in the Zimbabwean economy 
Smallholder agriculture plays a pivotal role in most African economies, particularly 
those of the SADC region.  In most parts of rural Africa, most households derive their 
livelihood from agriculture.  Hence, the emphasis most governments are placing on 
smallholder agricultural development and commercialization.  Despite its importance, 
smallholder agriculture faces a number of constraints.  It continues to suffer from low 
and declining productivity. Productivity still remains far below that of the large-scale 
commercial farming sector and the majority of the farmers still produce traditional 
food crops.  In Zimbabwe, crop yields for most crops are less than 30 percent of 
those of the large-scale commercial farming sector. Productivity accounts for as little 
as 3 percent of the annual area planted to principal crops.  In most SADC countries, 
smallholder agriculture is highly undercapitalized and is also not diversified and 
commercialized. If the current land tenure constraints are resolved, small scale 
agriculture productivity increase is likely to boost gross domestic product, reduce 
rural unemployment, and reduce poverty through increased farm incomes.  
 
This study will contribute to establishing whether increased tenure security is a 
necessary condition for increased investment and productivity in small-scale 
commercial agriculture in Zimbabwe. 
 
Potential Implications for Land Tenure Policy 
 
The arguments for freehold tenure for the smallholder sector in Zimbabwe are often 
based on economic theories and a few studies done in other countries.  No studies 
                                                           
2
 The ‘problem of endogeneity’ arises when the factors that are supposed to affect a particular 
outcome, depend themselves on that outcome. In an economic model, an endogenous change is one 
that comes from inside the model and is explained by the model itself. 
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have been done in Zimbabwe to establish the extent to which increased tenure 
security influences smallholder agriculture performance.  The results of this study will 
provide a useful guide to policy analysts and practitioners in reforming the existing 
land tenure arrangements that currently exist amongst smallholder farmers in 
Zimbabwe today.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
 
This study is organized into five chapters.  This chapter presented the study 
background, the research question, the rationale for the study, a summary of the 
research methodology and the delimitation of the scope of the study. 
 
Chapter 2 presents a detailed literature review on the small-scale commercial 
agriculture sector in Zimbabwe and also on the effects of increased land tenure 
security on farm investment and agricultural productivity.  Chapter 3 presents the 
detailed methodology employed in this study including an econometric model for 
assessing the link between tenure security, farm investment, and productivity.  
Chapter 4 presents a descriptive analysis whilst Chapter 5 presents the econometric 
results and discussion of the study.  Chapter 6 presents the summary, conclusions 
and implications of the study.   
 
1.5 Summary 
 
This chapter laid the foundation for the study.  It presented the research question 
and the key research issues to be explored during the study.  Using an econometric 
approach, this study will explore whether different land tenure conditions affect 
farming systems, organization and performance among Zimbabwean small scale 
commercial farmers. In addition, it presented a justification for the study, and the 
overall structure of the study.  
 
 
 
 9 
CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The main objective of this study is to identify the effects of land tenure security on 
small-scale commercial (SSC) agricultural productivity and development in 
Zimbabwe.  In this chapter, a brief review of SSC agriculture in Zimbabwe is given.  
This will be followed by a definition of the key concepts of the study that is land 
tenure and land tenure security.  The chapter then goes on to explore the theory 
linking land tenure security with agricultural productivity and development.  Finally, 
the chapter reviews a number of empirical studies that have been done to test the 
conceptual model linking tenure security with agricultural productivity and 
development.  
 
2.2 The Agricultural Sector in Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector comprises four major sub-sectors.  These are the 
large-scale commercial sub-sector (LSC), the small-scale commercial sub-sector 
(SSC), the resettlement area sub-sector (RA) and the communal area sub-sector 
(CA).  The SSC, RA and CA together form the smallholder sub-sector. Of 
Zimbabwe’s 39 million hectares, 33.3 million hectares are designated agricultural. 
The remaining 6 million hectares have been reserved for national parks and wild life 
and for urban settlements. Before the current land resettlement program, the 
agricultural land was distributed as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Land ownership by category of farmers 
Land category Total land area 
(million ha) 
Total number of 
farmers 
Large Scale Commercial 11.2 4,400 
Small Scale Commercial 1.2 10,000 
Communal 16.3 1,000,000 
Resettlement 3.3 60,000 
State 0.5  
 
Under the current land resettlement program, the government has designated close 
to 98 percent of the 11.2 million hectares of large-scale commercial farmland for 
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resettlement.  The new land distribution pattern will only be available after the land 
resettlement programme, and will result in a significant increase in the small scale 
commercial farming sector. The current average farm size in the CA sub-sector is 18 
hectares and of this, 3 – 5 hectares is arable. In the RA sub-sector, the average farm 
size is 58 hectares and about 3 – 5 hectares is arable.  For the SSC sub-sector, the 
average farm size is about 162 hectares of which 10 – 40 hectares are arable.  The 
LSC sub-sector average farm size is 2 223 hectares for private farms and 7 644 
hectares for state farms and the arable land varies considerably from region to 
region. 
 
Fifty-two percent of the SSC farms are under leasehold and the balance is under 
freehold title.  The farm sizes range from 70 hectares to 500 hectares.  Despite an 
apparently favourable land tenure system, SSC farmers continue to suffer from low 
and declining productivity. Productivity still remains far below that of the large-scale 
commercial farming sector.  Yields for most crops are less than 30 percent those of 
the large-scale commercial farming sector. 
 
2.2.1 Political Economy of Land and the Evolution of Small Scale Commercial 
Agriculture in Zimbabwe 
 
The current land distribution came into existence through a number of government 
legislations dating back to as early as 1889 when the white colonialists began 
acquiring all the high potential land, leaving the marginal areas for black settlement.   
Land and land reform has been the centre of debate for Zimbabwe since pre-
independence times.  Land redistribution did not start with the advent of 
independence in 1980.  Prior to the colonization of the country by the British, the 
people of Zimbabwe lived in communities where the traditional chiefs were the 
recognized land authorities.  In 1888, the colonialists identified land suitable for 
commercial agriculture and large-scale ranching and displaced the local people 
whom they resettled together with their chiefs in what are now known as communal 
lands.  Communal lands are therefore a creation of the very early land redistribution 
program carried out by the colonialists. 
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The colonialists strengthened their land reform and redistribution program by 
enacting, in 1931, the Land Apportionment Act.  This act designated land in terms of 
who lived and farmed therein.  In 1951, the Land Husbandry Act was introduced to 
reinforce agricultural practices in the areas designated by the previous acts. This 
legislative program was not achieved through universal suffrage as Africans were not 
allowed to vote. Prior to independence, Africans were prohibited from owning urban 
land, prohibited from developing in certain areas as well as being pushed into subtle 
separate development, and they had no rights to any land, even land in communal 
areas where the majority of them lived. Instead land rights were held on their behalf 
by the administrative machinery set up by the colonial governments such as the 
system of District Commissioners.  
 
At independence in 1980, around 40 percent of the total land area was occupied by 
the minority white commercial farmers, while the majority black peasants remained in 
less arable communal areas.  The agricultural sector consisted of three distinct sub-
sectors as follows 
(a) A large scale commercial sub-sector with about 6000 white farmers. The 
sector comprised more than 45% of prime agricultural land, mainly in the high 
potential natural regions I, II and III (Table 2). 
(b) A small scale commercial farming sub-sector with about 8500 black farmers 
taking up 5% of agricultural land.  More than 50% of this land lies in the drier 
natural regions IV and V. A distinct feature of the small scale commercial 
farming areas was that in the majority of cases, these were created as buffer 
zones between communal and commercial areas. This was a deliberate move 
by the settler authority to prohibit blacks from purchasing land in the white 
areas.  Thus, this policy was not meant to empower blacks to venture into 
successful commercial agriculture.   
(c) A communal sub-sector with approximately 800000 peasant farmers 
comprising less than 50% of agricultural land.  75% of this land lay in low 
potential natural regions IV and V. 
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Table 2: Percent Distribution of Land by Sector and Natural Regions 
Natural 
Regions3 
All Land Large-Scale 
Commercial 
Small-Scale 
Commercial 
Communal 
Areas 
I 1.8 3.0 0.5 0.7 
II 14.8 28.6 17.8 8.7 
III 17.8 17.5 37.9 17.1 
IV 36.3 25.2 36.9 47.6 
V 26.1 25.7 6.9 25.9 
 
During the first decade of independence, land redistribution was done on a ‘willing 
buyer, willing seller’ basis with the government having the first refusal option.4 The 
target for land redistribution is shown in Table 2a below.  The government’s first 
refusal option was intended to ensure the continued consolidation of commercial 
agricultural land and avoid fragmentation. 
 
Table 2a: Initial targets for Land Redistribution 
Ownership category Area (m.ha) 1980 Target area (m.ha) 
Large scale commercial 
farming sector 
15.5 5.0 
Small scale commercial 
farming sector 
1.4 1.4 
Resettlement - 8.3 
Communal areas 16.4 16.4 
State farms 0.3 2.5 
National parks and urban 
settlements 
6.0 6.0 
Total 39.6 39.6 
Source: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement 
 
Of the 10.5 million hectares to be acquired from the commercial farming sector 8.3 
million hectares was to be redistributed to landless people while 2.2 million hectares 
was to constitute state farms.  By the end of the first decade after independence, the 
government managed to acquire 40 percent of the targeted 8.3 million hectares 
meant for resettlement of the landless people, and 71,000 families out of a target of 
162,000 were resettled. 
 
                                                           
3
 Land distribution in Zimbabwe is categorized by five Natural Regions (NR) in descending order of 
productivity. NR1 is in the Eastern Highlands and is most suited for plantation crops and livestock production.   
NR II is good for maize, tobacco, cotton, wheat, as well as cattle. NR III is prone to drought so crop production 
is riskier, and NRs IV and V are generally only used for cattle and drought-resistant crops. 
4
 Under the first refusal option, all land was to be offered to Government first.  Only after government had 
refused to acquire such land for whatever reason was it to be offered to other interested parties. 
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In 1992, the government enacted the Land Acquisition Act which was meant to 
speed up the land reform process by removing the ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ 
clause, limiting the size of farms and introducing a land tax, though the tax was 
never implemented.  The Act empowered the government to buy land compulsorily 
for redistribution, and a fair compensation was to be paid for land acquired.  During 
the 1990s, less than 1 million hectares were acquired, and fewer than 20,000 
families were resettled.   
 
From July 2000, the Government embarked on a Fast track land reform program 
with the aim of acquiring about 12 million hectares for distribution.  Available 
statistics show that by end of 2002, the government had acquired about 10.5 million 
hectares of which 7.3 million hectares had been distributed under the A1 farm 
model5 benefiting about 160,340 households, 1.7 million had been distributed under 
the A2 farm model6 benefiting about 27,854 households and the remainder was still 
to be planned and allocated.  To date, the fast track land reform program is still to be 
concluded and it is only when this is done that a true distribution of the land by 
farming category can be established. 
 
All land that has been resettled by the Government since independence is occupied 
under leasehold tenure, while some other land remains freehold. The land holding 
rights and obligations in Zimbabwe find their expression in the country's four main 
systems of land tenure, namely the freehold (private), state land, communal and 
leasehold (resettlement) systems.  The tenure systems impact and shape the 
property rights and natural resource access regimes that exist in the country.   
 
The freehold tenure system is prevalent in both the commercial farming sectors 
which consists of large scale and small scale commercial farmers who occupy about 
32% of the country's land area of 39 million hectares.  The registered farm owner 
has exclusive property rights and full control and responsibility over the land and 
everything attached to it except to the extent that ownership and exclusive control 
over the land and some natural resources may be limited by statutory provisions.  
                                                           
5
 It is villagized, self contained and has three-tier land use plans 
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Such limitations relate to changes in land use, control over public water courses, 
felling of indigenous timber resources and controls on wildlife. In Zimbabwe, this is 
the most secure tenure system and it is often argued that it provides land owners 
with the incentives to conserve and improve the natural resource base.  
 
The communal land tenure system is governed by the Communal Lands Act and is 
applicable to 42% of Zimbabwe's land area.  According to the Communal Lands Act, 
all communal land is vested in the State President who has powers to permit its 
occupation and utilization in accordance with the Act.  Communal Area inhabitants 
thus have usufructuary rights over communal land.  It is often argued that the 
communal land tenure system is a disincentive to long term investment in agriculture 
and other key natural resources such as forests. 
 
The State set aside 15% of the country as gazetted/protected forests (2%) and 
national parks (13%).  These offer good examples of in situ conservation and 
sustainable use of Zimbabwe's biological heritage. The remainder of the land is 
under leasehold tenure (permit or resettlement) systems.  The lease is an agreement 
between the state, through the Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement 
and the Lessee. Land use under leasehold is limited by the purpose of the lease and 
land legislation.  Lease conditions for example may limit stocking limits, or land use 
options.  The system imposes high levels of care on the leaseholder and any lease 
transfers may require State approval.  There are no rights to subdivide or aggregate 
land.  The state retains the power to acquire or withhold leases when the leasing 
period expires (Murombedzi and Gomera, 2004). 
 
Literature on the economics of SSC farming in Zimbabwe is not readily available.  
However, raw data on production statistics and crop forecasts can be obtained 
especially for the post independent era.  Prior to independence in 1980, SSC farming 
data was often reported aggregated with that of the LSC on the assumption that both 
sectors were commercial. However, the two are completely different in performance, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6
 Meant to replace the commercial sector but with a focus to increase the number of farmers by demarcating 
land holdings larger than the A1 but not as large as the existing commercial farm holdings. 
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and that aggregation made it very difficult to effectively appraise the performance of 
the SSC sub-sector. 
 
2.3 Land Tenure Security and Agricultural Development 
 
This section explores the effects of land tenure security on agricultural development.  
It first presents a definition of the core concepts of the study, that is, land tenure and 
land tenure security.  This is then followed by a detailed discussion of the conceptual 
framework of land ownership security and farm productivity. 
 
2.3.1 Definition of Core Concepts 
 
One of the most important current land problems associated with agricultural 
productivity and the modernization of agriculture is the land tenure question. The 
land tenure system embodies ‘… those legal and contractual or customary 
arrangements whereby people in farming gain access to productive opportunities on 
the land.  It constitutes the rules and procedures governing the rights, duties, 
liberties and exposures of individuals and groups in the use and control over the 
basic resources of land and water’ (Dorner, 1972).  It includes public and private 
rights and written and unwritten sets of laws.  
 
In the broad sense, land tenure is also seen as the equivalent to land tenure 
systems; this way of viewing land tenure concentrates on the relationships between 
people and land.  Land tenure systems include the entire scope of land tenure 
relationships and are part of the more comprehensive property rights system. Land 
tenure systems are composed of a static and a dynamic component. The static 
component subsumes instruments for land administration while the dynamic 
component comprises instruments for land development and reform processes.  
Thus, land tenure comprises the habitual and/or legal rights that individuals or 
groups have to land, and the resulting social relationships between the members of 
the society.  
 
The scholarly literature on tenure emphasizes the need for tenure security.  The 
various types of tenure, including the registered title, can be secure or insecure 
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depending on social, legal and administrative institutions in a given society.  Most 
smallholder farmer organizations in the SADC region often make the implicit 
assumption that title ownership and ownership security are synonymous. However, 
ownership is not necessarily synonymous with ownership security.  Tenure 
insecurity, narrowly defined, is the landholder’s perception of the probability of losing 
land within some future time period. It can also be defined more broadly as the 
landholder’s perception of the likelihood of losing a specific right in land such as the 
right to cultivate, graze, fallow, transfer, or mortgage. Thus, one cannot assume that 
landholder tenure security can be captured by a simple dichotomy of “titled” and 
“untitled” owners.  In Africa, customary land allocation provides individuals with 
tenure security to such rights as grazing and cultivation, without any legal title 
definition, registration, or government enforcement.  However, traditional tenure 
systems may weaken with rising population densities and declining land-labor ratios.  
Conversely, high levels of tenure insecurity may exist even with legal title, for 
example when the formal legal code is ambiguous in its definition of rights or when 
the government lacks the will or the means to enforce those rights.  Legal title to land 
increases security only to the extent that the government’s definition and 
enforcement of property rights provides a more secure set of ownership rights and 
enforcement than that provided by existing tenure systems. 
 
Security of tenure is thus associated with four sets of rights.  The basket of rights, 
therefore, indicates the relative security of a tenure system depending on secured 
rights from the four sets as follows (Dorner, 1972): 
 Use rights are rights to grow crops, trees, make permanent improvement, 
harvest trees and fruits, and so on;  
 Transfer rights are rights to transfer land or use rights, i.e., rights to sell, give, 
mortgage, lease, rent or bequeath; 
 Exclusion and inclusion rights are rights by an individual, group or community 
to exclude others from the rights discussed above; and 
 Enforcement rights refer to the legal, institutional and administrative 
provisions to guarantee rights. 
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Institutional arrangements include instruments for defining and enforcing property 
rights, be they formal procedures, or social customs, beliefs, and attitudes 
determining legitimacy and recognition of these rights (Taylor, 1988). Enforcement 
often requires a buttress of instruments such as courts, police, financial institutions, 
the legal profession, land surveys, cadastral and record keeping systems, and land 
titling agencies. 
 
Tenure systems can be categorized on the basis of the degree of exclusivity of 
rights.  On this basis all tenure systems fall into four broad categories: open access, 
communal, private and state (Table 3).  As a general observation, some land may 
appear or behave as open access but such land is usually state land or communal 
land.  When the state or community lacks adequate legal and enforcement capacity, 
or such capacity comes under pressure, the resultant insecurity of tenure is 
evidenced through land use patterns that mimic open access systems. 
 
Table 3: Categories of land tenure systems 
CATEGORY OWNERSHIP OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS 
Open access None 
Communal Defined group 
Private Individual legal entity 
State Public sector 
 
Exclusivity (to individual or group) therefore defines the degree of tenure security. 
Under communal tenure, exclusive rights are assigned to a group. Individual or 
family rights are also assigned under most traditional tenure systems for arable land 
(Migot-Adholla et. al., 1991). 
  
Private property rights are the most prevalent form of tenure in industrialized western 
countries. Private land rights are not God-given or sacred rights, but rather that 
private property is a creation of the state. After all, private property is not and cannot 
be an absolute right (Dorner, 1992).  Where private property rights are not viewed as 
legitimate, or not generally viewed as working in public interest, or where they are 
simply not enforced adequately, de jure private property becomes de facto open 
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access. Institutions, or rules of the game and how the rules are applied, are most 
important in determining how secure rights are, and this goes for all tenure systems.  
Ultimately, and in the abstract, there is no tenure system that is good or bad, right or 
wrong, but rather that any tenure system has to be secure, appropriate, and able to 
facilitate the needs of a community or society.   
 
Thus, tenure systems have two important dimensions: property rights definition 
(security of land rights associated with tenure possession) and property rights 
distribution (to whom these land rights are distributed) (Carter, Roth and Feder 
1995).  Land tenure security is thus the individual’s perception of his/her rights to a 
piece of land on a continual basis, free from imposition or interference from outside 
sources, as well as the ability to reap the benefits of labor or capital invested in land, 
either in use or upon alienation.  This definition contains three components – 
breadth, duration and assurance – with legal and economic dimensions (Place, Roth 
and Hazell 1994). 
 Breadth refers to the quantity or bundle of rights held, or possession of key 
rights if certain ones are more important than others. 
 Duration is the length of time that a given right is legally valid.  The economic 
dimension requires, in addition, that the time horizon be sufficiently long to 
enable the holder to recoup with confidence the full income stream generated 
by the investment. As land rights are generally secure for the season, tenure 
insecurity tends to be less important for short-term inputs or innovations 
(fertilizer, new seed varieties) than for capital long-term improvements with 
benefit streams stretching far into the future (tree crops, buildings). 
 Assurance implies that right(s) and duration are known and held with 
certainty. 
 
The legal dimension defines the composition (breadth) and duration of rights in the 
bundle, and implies that one holds with complete assurance all rights embodied in 
his or her tenure, even if that tenure is of short duration and confers meager rights. 
The economic dimension defines the value of economic benefits derived from de 
facto tenure in the land resource.  Economic actions may diverge from legal 
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provisions due to weak or costly enforcement, high transaction costs, and corrupt or 
illicit behavior.  
 
Tenure insecurity from an economic perspective is thus some function of three 
factors: (1) inadequate number of rights or lack of key rights (use rights, transfer 
rights, exclusion and inclusion rights and enforcement rights); (2) inadequate 
duration; and/or (3) lack of assurance.  These factors must furthermore be applied in 
ways that address questions of tenure security for whom and to what piece of land – 
i.e., property rights distribution. 
 
2.3.2 A Conceptual Framework of Land Ownership Security and Farm 
Productivity 
 
Feder et al. (1988) argues that security of tenure and social stability conferred by a 
tenure system are the most impelling forces which encourage the rapid adoption of 
agricultural innovations among many farming communities. There is a widespread 
belief among development specialists that land tenure security is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for economic development.  Compared with weak or insufficient 
property rights, tenure security (1) increases credit use through greater incentives for 
investment, improved creditworthness of projects, and enhanced collateral value of 
land; (2) increases land transactions, facilitating land transfers from less efficient to 
more efficient users by increasing the certainty of contracts and lowering 
enforcement costs; (3) reduces the incidence of land disputes through clearer 
definition and protection of rights; and raises productivity through increased 
agricultural investment (Feder and Noronha 1987, Barrows and Roth 1990). 
 
The theoretical model relating tenure security to agricultural performance (Figure 1) 
is drawn from Feder et al. (1988).  The land ownership security and farm productivity 
conceptual framework, developed by Feder et al. (1988), is built around two key 
linkages that connect land titles to economic performance: the positive effects of land 
titles on land tenure security and investment incentives; and the role of land titles in 
collateral arrangements for institutional credit.   
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On the other hand, agricultural performance can be also conceptualized in two 
dimensions: (1) productivity and investment impacts; and (2) labor absorption, 
income distribution and stability. The former emphasizes efficiency objectives 
although not entirely.  The later emphasizes the importance of equity objectives, 
although labor absorption and stability may also constitute efficient outcomes.  
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model linking Tenure Security with Agricultural Sustainability and Productivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Feder et al. (1988) 
 
The model suggests both demand-side (incentives to farmers) and supply-side 
(incentives to lenders) effects.  On the demand side, an enhancement in tenure 
security would increase farmer demand for medium to long-term land improvements, 
and to a lesser extent, for mobile farm equipment.  This increase in demand is 
derived from two sources.  First, greater tenure security would increase the likelihood 
that the operator will capture the returns from investments. According to Feder et al. 
(1988) land tenure security that accrues from land registration, removes uncertainty 
on whether or not landowners can reap the benefits from any long term investments 
they make such as on-farm tertiary irrigation systems, drainage, soil and water 
conservation, and construction of a rental house.  With positive expectations about 
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exclusive enjoyment of any returns earned from investment, landowners develop 
interest in investing in land improvements as well as making land-based investments 
in agriculture and non-agricultural activities.  This boosts demand for investment, 
which in turn increases demand for complementary inputs including labor, and 
agricultural inputs (including credit). 
 
Second, increased tenure security would reduce the incidence of disputes, freeing 
up resources, which would otherwise have been used for litigation.  Demand for 
complementary inputs (farm chemicals, labor) will also increase because the 
enhanced tenure security will encourage land improvements (e.g., higher water 
retention from construction of ridges increases fertilizer profitability).  Assuming the 
existence of viable technologies, access to inputs and extension advice, and the 
availability of household labor and financial resources, enhanced tenure security will 
lead to higher investment and hence higher yields. 
 
Because of potential supply-side effects, higher yields are possible even if 
households lack sufficient financial resources of their own.  Individualized tenure 
accompanied by transferable title may improve the creditworthiness of the 
landholder, especially for long-term credit, and may enhance the land’s collateral 
value, thereby raising lenders’ expected returns. Land titles are associated with 
collateral arrangements in the following way.  When borrowers apply for loans, land 
titles are often pledged as collateral.  The pledging of land titles, accompanied by 
registration of mortgage transactions, helps to overcome the problems of 
asymmetrical information and the related incentive problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection.  These collateral arrangements are crucial to lending institutions 
and the credit markets because they partly or fully shift the risk of loan loss from the 
lenders to the borrowers since a default on the loan would trigger the loss of 
collateral to the borrower. The prospect of losing property rights to the collateral 
works as an incentive for the borrower to repay the loan; at least, it works as an 
incentive for borrowers to avoid intentional default (moral hazard).  In addition, 
collateral mitigates the problem of adverse selection as it enables the lender to 
screen out borrowers most likely to default (Feder et. al., 1988).  
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In the event of default, property rights to collateral are transferred to the lender, if 
there are adequate legal and regulatory arrangements for foreclosure.  The lender 
can then sell the collateral (land) to recover the loan if there is an active land market, 
free of sale restrictions.  Land is regarded as a highly suitable collateral asset, with 
desirable characteristics being sedentary, difficult to permanently damage and with 
generally low maintenance requirements (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986). For a 
given interest rate, the amount of credit is expected to increase as the collateral 
increases, up to a point when credit rationing is triggered (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  
In addition, for a given amount of credit, the interest rate will be substantially lower 
when collateral is used.   
 
Improved security of tenure can raise the expected returns from investment and 
ease credit constraints.  This in turn can raise investment levels and thenceforth 
productivity.  Secure tenure to land helps assure investors that the returns to their 
investment will not be expropriated by government or private agents.  If land tenure 
is secure, a functioning land market that allows transfer of property from one owner 
(or possessor of user rights) to another can help raise productivity by transferring 
land from less efficient cultivators to more efficient ones.  This overall productivity 
gain, of course, is greater if there are functioning credit markets – otherwise the 
more efficient farmers would not be able to raise the capital needed for the purchase.  
Productivity increases also depend on sellers being able to engage in other income-
generating activity.   
 
According to Gavian and Fafchamps (1996), land tenure is thought to influence 
agricultural productivity through the security (or investment demand) effect.  
According to this hypothesis, the uncertainty of a user’s claim to land lessens 
expected future returns to current investments.  Afraid of not recouping the 
investment made, the user hesitates to spend resources on land improving inputs.  
The study hypothesizes that land title can stimulate investment by means of the 
collateral effect (or credit supply).  By turning land into a mortgageable, transferable 
commodity, farmers can use it as collateral to access the credit needed for 
productivity-enhancing investments. For this reason, land title is thought to raise the 
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supply of investment capital available to farmers (see for example Feder et al.; Bruce 
and Migot-Adholla; Atwood; Barrows and Roth; Green; Kille and Lyne).  
 
Broadly speaking, landowners are expected to be both more willing and more able to 
undertake investment where private property rights prevail.  They are more willing to 
invest for essentially two reasons.  First, when farmers feel more secure in their right 
or ability to maintain long-term use over their land, the return to long-term land 
improvements and conservation measures is higher, and they have therefore a 
greater incentive to undertake investments.  This is the ‘assurance effect’.  Second, 
when land can be more easily converted to liquid assets through sale-that is, when 
superior transfer rights have the effect of lowering the costs of exchange if the land is 
either rented or sold-, improvements made through investment can be better 
realized, thereby increasing its expected return.  Investment incentives are again 
enhanced.  This is the ‘realizability effect’.  On the other hand, farmers are more able 
to invest because, when freehold titles are established, land acquires collateral value 
and access to credit is easier.  This ‘collateralisation effect’ is especially important 
regarding formal lending sources which often have imperfect information on the 
borrower [Feder and Nishio, 1997:5].  
 
Land rights typically are not necessarily predetermined.  Under sporadic land 
registration systems, the landholder chooses whether or not to register land and may 
have some choice in the type of tenure.  An individual can enhance long term claims 
to land by investing in improvements.  High yields due to good farmer practices may 
improve eligibility for long-term tenure in government sponsored resettlement or farm 
development schemes.  Land rights normally adapt to agricultural commercialization, 
and to broader economic and political factors (Feder and Noronha 1987).  These 
dynamics and interdependence are very complex and greatly complicate the 
analysis of land tenure and performance.  
 
Usually such factors are assumed to be exogenous to the individual or household 
within reasonable time parameters, enabling analyses that conclude “this tenure 
system produced that result”.  But there are risks that complicate easy interpretation 
and synthesis of empirical studies.  First, there is risk of spurious causality, in effect 
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concluding that tenure security particular to a system produced or failed to produce a 
desired outcome when other important or leading factors are discounted or ignored.  
Second, there is the dynamic risk that the land tenure system observed at one point 
in time changes states of security in response to population pressure, market 
access, technological innovation, growing land scarcity and political uncertainty.  
 
2.4 Review of Empirical Studies 
 
Having looked at the conceptual framework of land ownership security and farm 
productivity in the preceding section, this section discusses some of the studies that 
have formally tested the relationship between tenure security and agricultural 
performance.  A number of studies outside of southern Africa have formally tested 
the nature and strength of the linkages between tenure security and agricultural 
performance using the conceptual framework in figure 1 (Feder and Onchan, 1987, 
in Thailand; Hayes, Roth and Zepeda, 1997, in the Gambia; and Place and Hazell, 
1993, in Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda).  
 
Many scholars have outlined the beneficial economic effects, which accompany 
proper recording of private property rights (secure tenure to land ownership).  There 
is allocative efficiency and dynamic benefits from land conservation and 
improvement (Demstz, 1967; Johnson, 1972; Ault and Rutman, 1979; Feder, 1987; 
Feder et al, 1988; Feder and Feeney, 1991; Barzel, 1989; Binswanger et al, 1995 in 
Plateau, undated).  First more efficient crop choices are possible through the 
removal of bias towards short term cycle crops (arising from insecurity of tenure) and 
second land can be transferred from less to more dynamic farmers with 
consolidation into larger holdings.  This eliminates excessive fragmentation and 
subdivision encouraged by traditional systems.  The dynamic impact of land titling, 
put simply can be explained by the fact that legally protected land owners can be 
expected to be more willing and able to undertake investments.   
 
Feder and Onchan (1987) were among the first to emprically test the increased 
investment argument in a rigorous way. Feder et al. (1987) investigated the impact of 
land ownership security on farm investment and land improvements in Thailand. 
Data from three provinces in Thailand were used to support theoretical propositions 
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and estimate the impact of ownership security. Econometric analysis showed that in 
two provinces, ownership security induced significantly higher capital/land ratios. In a 
third province, with a well-developed, informal credit market, ownership security was 
less important and the impact on capital formation was less significant. The study 
showed that land-improving investments were significantly affected by ownership 
security.  Also, ownership security enhances capital formation by providing better 
incentives and improved access to credit.   
 
Hayes and Roth (1997) investigated the determinants of investment, input use, and 
productivity under customary tenure in peri-urban areas of Gambia. The conceptual 
model employed by Hayes and Roth draws from Feder.  Key differences were that 
three types of investments were considered, and that the supply-side link between 
credit access, tenure security, and investments/inputs was omitted.  A study of 120 
households in three villages in the peri-urban area of Gambia was done.  The study 
measured the impacts of different levels of tenure security on farm investment, input 
use, and yield in order to examine the role of tenure security in increasing 
agricultural production.  Tenure security was measured based on whether the plot 
manager believed he or she has complete transfer rights (the right to sell the land). 
Tenure insecurity is represented by the probability of being evicted from one’s land. 
The study found positive relationships between tenure security, the propensity to 
make long term land improvements, and the presence of trees on a plot.  Also long 
term land improvements were found to enhance yield.  
 
The study also found that credit access in rural Gambia rarely depended on the use 
of land as collateral and loans were infrequently (less than 3%) used for agricultural 
purposes.  Thus, tenure security affects investment mainly through the demand side 
– that is, through the assurance that the returns of investments will accrue to those 
who make investments. The farmer chooses between investments in capital 
equipment, which is not lost in the event of eviction; land improvements, which are 
completely lost in an eviction; and nonagricultural activities and assets, which are 
unaffected by eviction.  The farmer invests in the first period or season and produces 
in the second season, with the objective of maximizing expected terminal wealth at 
the end of the second period.  Terminal wealth consists of production value, land 
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value, and returns to nonagricultural activities, less any debts incurred through credit 
use.  Tenure security indirectly affects productivity through investment.  In their 
study, Deininger and Chamorro (2002) also found that the propensity to undertake 
largely labor-intensive investments in Nicaragua is increased significantly by the 
receipt of land title. 
 
Much of the land tenure literature on sub-Saharan Africa concerns the hypothesis 
that tenure insecurity has a negative impact upon the propensity to invest in land 
improvements.  Indigenous land tenure systems, under which farmers often do not 
hold title to land they cultivate, have been charged with failing to provide farmers with 
adequate incentives or means to make land improvements or adopt new 
technologies that could enhance production efficiency (Parsons, 1971).  However, 
some authors such as Place and Hazell (1993) argue that lack of credit access, 
insufficient human capital and labor shortages adversely affect investment decisions 
more often than tenure insecurity. Roth, Cochrane, and Kisamba-Mugerwa (1993, 
1994), in their study of Rukungiri District, Uganda, consider the role of title in 
promoting farm investments.  The authors conclude that farmers value land 
registration and suggest that the process be simplified to allow more farmers to 
register their land.  
 
Using survey data from the Niger, Gavian and Fafcjamps (1996) tested whether 
traditional land tenure systems allocate land efficiently and whether tenure insecurity 
affects households’ manure allocation.  They found robust evidence that tenure 
insecurity incites farmers to divert scarce manure resources to more secure fields 
whenever they can.  On the other hand, they found no evidence linking tenure 
security to short-term investment decisions. They also concluded that in an 
environment of multiple market imperfections where customary forms of land tenure 
do not pose tenure security constraints, land titling and other measures to encourage 
land markets are not likely to induce increased investment, productivity, or efficiency.  
 
Although studies from Thailand offer evidence for the collateral and security effects 
of land title (e.g., Feder 1987; Feder et al. 1988; Feder and Onchan, 1987), similar 
research in Africa, however, has been far less conclusive.  A collection of World 
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Bank studies from Ghana, Rwanda, and Kenya found little relation between land 
rights and credit, in part because both formal and informal capital markets are very 
thin.  Even in Kenya, where landowners could show formal documents, title was 
unrelated to formal credit, the term of loan maturity, or the size of loans (e.g., Migot-
Adholla et al. 1994a; Migot-Adholla, Hazell, and Place, 1991; Carter, Wiebe, and 
Blarel, 1989). Only one study in South Africa succeeded at empirically linking tenure 
security to input use (Kille and Lyne, 1993).  On the whole, therefore, existing 
empirical studies have failed to establish strong links between land rights, 
investments, and agricultural productivity on African crop lands.   
 
Recent results obtained in Burkina Faso also cast doubt on the existence of a 
systematic influence of land tenure security on investment (Anne-Sophie Brasselle, 
Frederic Gaspart and Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2002).  In fact, in Burkina Faso, land-
related investment appears to be undertaken primarily to increase tenure security 
rather than as a consequence of more secure rights (Brasselle et al., 2002). 
Brasselle et al. (2002) concluded that the village order, where it exists, provides the 
basic land rights required to stimulate small-scale investment.  
 
Verifying empirically the impact of land tenure security on investment behaviour is a 
more difficult task than what it may appear at first sight.  The reason is that there is a 
problem in inferring from the existence of a significant relationship between tenure 
security and agricultural investment that causality actually runs from the former to the 
latter.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, some land improvements, particularly the planting of 
trees, is a well-recognized method of enhancing tenure security for holders of 
temporary or fragile claims [see, e.g., Bruce, 1988; Noronha, 1985; Robertson, 1987; 
Atwood, 1990; Place and Hazel, 1993; Sjaastad and Bronley, 1997; De Zeeuw, 
1997].  Again, there exists a two-way relationship between land rights and 
investment.  
 
So far, only a few studies have actually dealt with the problem of endogenous land 
rights while estimating the effect of tenure security on agricultural investment.    
Notable studies by Moor (1996);  Feder (1987); and Hayes, Roth and Zepeda (1997) 
failed to control for the endogeneity of land rights. Besley (1995) re-worked the data 
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collected by the World Bank on Ghana to assess the sensitivity of the results to the 
estimation methodology used.  The conclusion is that such sensitivity is considerable 
since the results have been simply inverted.  More precisely, while the original World 
Bank study (Migot-Adholla et. al., 1994a) concluded that tenure security has a clearly 
positive impact on investment in the region of Anloga but less noticeable impact in 
Wassa (and no impact at all in Ejura), Besley’s study reached the opposite 
conclusion that better land rights facilitate investment in Wassa but not in Anloga.   A 
recent study of 36 villages in central Uganda concludes that investment enhances 
tenure security, yet the converse relationship is not true (Baland et al., 1999).   
 
2.5 Summary 
 
From a theoretical perspective, secure property rights are generally considered to be 
a precondition for economic growth and development, for three reasons, namely (i) 
they provide the incentives necessary for owners to undertake land-related 
investments thus helping to maintain and increase sustainability of resource use and 
agricultural productivity;  (ii) they decrease the cost of transacting land in the market, 
thus helping to increase allocative efficiency in the economy; and (iii) availability of 
formal land title increases credit supply by providing a basis for institutional lenders 
to actually foreclose on a property in case of default (Besley 1995; Binswanger et al. 
1995; Deininger and Feder 1999). 
 
The notion that the greater tenure security accorded by possession of registered 
land title will be associated with higher levels of investment is a key element in the 
literature (e.g. Feder et al. 1988).  The relationship between possession of title and 
higher levels of land-attached investments has repeatedly been confirmed in cross-
sectional equations (Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995).  Numerous studies 
have demonstrated that land tenure has an investment-enhancing effect (Besley 
1985, Rozelle et al. 1998; Gavian and Fafchamphs 1996).  However, the overall 
productivity gain, is greater if there are functioning credit markets – otherwise the 
more efficient farmers would not be able to raise the capital needed for the purchase. 
If land tenure is secure, a functioning land market that allows transfer of property 
from one owner (or possessor of user rights) to another can help raise productivity 
by transferring land from less efficient cultivators to more efficient ones. Productivity 
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increases also depend on sellers being able to engage in other income-generating 
activity. 
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CHAPTER THREE – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the detailed research methodology used to collect data for 
addressing the research question and research issues identified in section 1.2 of 
chapter one of this study.  The chapter briefly reviews the relevance of the positivist 
research paradigm to the study before discussing in detail the research design.  The 
study used a descriptive research design and two methods of data collection were 
used for the study.  These are secondary data collection and primary data collection 
methods. 
  
3.2 Research Paradigm 
 
There are four conceptual frameworks within which a researcher may work under 
scientific research (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).  These are positivism, critical realism 
or post positivism, critical theory and constructivism.  This study is predominantly 
based on the positivism paradigm. Positivism assumes that reality exists and is 
driven by natural mechanisms and that there is truth that the research can discover 
(Gephart, 1999; Guba and Lincoln, 1994).  It also assumes an objective world hence 
it often involves searches for facts conceived in terms of specified correlations and 
associations among variables.  In positivism the goal is to uncover the truth and facts 
as quantitatively specified relations among variables.  The research is based on 
collecting empirical quantitative data to address the research question and also to 
test the relationship between security of tenure and farm performance as discussed 
in the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2 of this study.  Positivism is most 
appropriate for this study because: 
 In positivism, the purpose of the inquiry is explanation, ultimately enabling the 
prediction and control of phenomena, whether physical or human (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994). In this research the main objective is to find out if security of land 
tenure influences small-scale commercial agriculture performance in Zimbabwe. 
 In positivism, knowledge consists of verified hypotheses that can be accepted as 
facts or laws (Gephart, 1999).  Through the literature review that has been 
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conducted for this research, a number of hypotheses have been formulated for 
the study and these were tested using the empirical data to be collected during 
the research. 
 In positivism, ethics is an important consideration (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).  
Throughout this study, ethical behaviour on the part of the researcher was taken 
seriously during the inquiry process. Section 3.6 of this chapter discusses the 
various ethical considerations of this study.   
 
3.3 Research Design 
 
A research design is a framework for action that serves as a bridge between 
research questions and the execution or implementation of the research (Babbie and 
Mouton, 2001).  It is used to structure the research, to show how all of the major 
parts of the research project work together to try to address the central research 
question.  Research designs may be classified into three broad categories namely, 
exploratory, descriptive or causal (Zikmund, 2000; Guba and Lincolm, 1994 and 
Babbie and Mouton, 2001).  The various types of designs have different strengths 
and weaknesses and some are better for answering some types of questions than 
others.  Feasibility and costs are also important determinants in choosing the 
appropriate design.  An exploratory design is appropriate for developing an initial, 
rough understanding of a phenomenon and the data collection methods normally 
used are literature reviews, interviews, case studies and key informants interviews.  
The descriptive design is most appropriate for precise measurement and reporting of 
the characteristics of the population or phenomenon and the data collection methods 
are usually census, surveys and qualitative studies.  The causal design is most 
appropriate for studying cause-and-effect relationships among variables and the data 
collection is normally done through experiments. 
 
A descriptive research design is chosen for this study.  The descriptive design is 
used because (1) It helps understand the characteristics of a group; (2) It aids in 
thinking systematically about aspects in a given situation; (3) It offers ideas for 
further probing; and (4) It helps make certain decisions (Zikmund, 2000).  The 
descriptive design is closely associated with the positivism paradigm and is also 
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most appropriate for studying the nature of relationships amongst variables.  In this 
study, the primary purpose is to find out the relationships between land tenure 
security and small-scale commercial agriculture performance.   
 
3.3.1 Data Collection Methods   
 
Both secondary and primary data were used for the study.  The main source of 
secondary data was the production data available from the Central Statistical Office 
(CSO), various commodity associations and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). 
Secondary data was used for the study because of the following advantages: 
• It is considerably cheaper and faster than doing original studies.  Thus time 
and resources were saved, as the data is easily accessible and relatively 
inexpensive.  
• The study can benefit from the research from some of the top scholars in the 
field, which for the most part ensures quality data.  Thus, the study can 
compare data obtained through in-depth interviews in order to assess the 
generalisability of findings.  
• The quality of secondary data maybe higher because it is obtained from larger 
and often national samples.  It is also gathered in a consistent way over time. 
As a result, through re-analyzing, unforeseen or unexpected new discoveries 
can be made.  
• Time series data is also available from the national statistical records.  This 
makes it possible for studying the performance of the small-scale commercial 
farming sector over time.  
However, despite having the above advantages, the study also takes note of some 
major limitations of secondary data that need to be addressed to reduce their 
potential impact on the findings. 
• One disadvantage noted in using available secondary data was that the data 
was used for a purpose other than that for which it was original collected for. 
Therefore, specific items or factors of interest may have not been assessed, 
may have been collected in a different manner, or collected with less depth 
than the study would prefer. 
 33 
• Although timeliness is an advantage of secondary analysis, there is a variable 
lag period (almost three years) between data collection and data availability in 
Zimbabwe.  
• Since many available secondary data deal with national populations, and the 
study is interested in studying small-scale commercial farmers as a well-
defined minority subgroup it was difficult finding relevant data.  The majority of 
available secondary data aggregates small-scale commercial farming 
statistics with that of large-scale commercial agriculture.  
• Most of available secondary data are available in statistical packages that are 
not compatible with modern packages like SPSS and this makes it difficult to 
access and use it.  
• Although surveys often allow analyses for specific population subgroups, 
there may be insufficient sample size to study a particular group or condition 
of interest.  
• Non-response to the surveys or individual items may introduce bias. 
• Although longitudinal data sets can support development of predictive models, 
creating the analytic files to support these analyses is challenging in most 
surveys, and limitations such as sample attrition are common. 
• Investigations using survey data are subject to all of the inherent limitations of 
observational studies. However, observational studies may be the only 
feasible way to answer the study question, and statistical methods are 
available to account for and minimize potential bias in these analyses.  
• Differences in survey methods such as sampling frame, item wording, and 
timing of data collection may result in different estimates for a similar question 
derived from different data sources. Therefore, the study must pay attention to 
the specifics of survey methodology and understand how this may influence 
results. 
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Primary data for the study was collected mainly through a questionnaire (Appendix 
1) that was administered through personal interviews with selected farmers.  The 
personal interview approach is a direct, personal interaction in which respondents 
are probed to uncover underlying motivations, beliefs, attitudes, and feelings on a 
topic. The personal interview approach has been chosen amongst other typical 
surveys because of the following advantages:  
• It will allow the researcher to obtain complete and precise information. 
• It will provide the opportunity for feedback during the data collection exercise and 
allows the interviewer to answer questions from the respondent (Zikmund, 2000). 
• It will provide the opportunity for probing (Zikmund, 2000). 
• The possibility for respondent misunderstanding is also lowest.  If the participant, 
for example, does not understand a question or needs further explanation on a 
particular issue, it is possible to converse with the participant. 
• It produces the lowest non-response items.  Although obtaining a certain number 
of respondents who are willing to take time to do an interview is difficult, the 
researcher has more control over the response rate in the personal interview 
approach than with other types of survey research.  As opposed to mail surveys 
where the researcher must wait to see how many respondents actually answer 
and send back the survey, a researcher using the personal interview approach 
can, if the time and money are available, interview respondents until the required 
sample has been achieved. 
• It can allow for a lengthy interview (Zikmund, 2000). 
 
Thus, in summary, interviewing offers the flexibility to react to the respondent’s 
situation, probe for more detail, seek more reflective replies and ask questions which 
are complex or personally intrusive. Despite having the above advantages, the 
personal interview approach is costly and may also introduce bias from either the 
interviewer or the interviewee. 
 
The study used key informant interviews to augment the data that was collected from 
secondary sources and the in-depth interviews with the selected sample farmers.  
Key informant interviews were done with local farmer leadership and extension staff.  
Collecting data from multiple sources facilitated triangulation of the data sources and 
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enhanced validity of the data analysis (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996).  Also before 
designing the final questionnaire to be used for primary data collection, the draft 
questionnaire presented in appendix 1 was pilot-tested in two stages to improve on 
validity and reliability, with suggested modifications from the first stage being 
incorporated for the second stage.    
 
Survey investigations attempt to describe what is happening or learn the reasons of 
a particular business activity (Zikmund, 2000).  The survey methodology was used 
because: 
 It is a quick, inexpensive, efficient and an accurate means of assessing 
information about the population (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996).  Instead of 
interviewing the 10 000 small-scale commercial farmers for the study, a 
representative sample of these farmers was interviewed during the research. 
 The survey methodology is useful for describing the characteristics of a large 
population.  No other method of observation can provide this general capability. 
 The survey methodology also allows for flexibility during the course of the study if 
needed (Zikmund, 2000).  For example, if the sampled farmer is not available 
during the period of the interview, then the farmer can easily be replaced by 
sampling another farmer from the study population. 
 Many questions can be asked about a given topic giving considerable flexibility 
to the analysis. 
 Standardized questions make measurement more precise by enforcing uniform 
definitions upon the participants.  Also, standardization ensures that similar data 
can be collected from groups then interpreted comparatively (between-group 
study). 
 Usually, high reliability is easy to obtain—by presenting all subjects with a 
standardized stimulus, observer subjectivity is greatly eliminated. 
 
However, despite having the above advantages, the survey methodology may suffer 
from both random sampling errors and systematic errors if not properly designed 
and executed.  Throughout the research process, measures were put in place to try 
and minimize these two major sources of error.  One way of checking on the 
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accuracy of the primary data was to compare it to the few available secondary data.   
Other weaknesses of the survey methodology are: 
• A methodology relying on standardization forces the researcher to develop 
questions general enough to be minimally appropriate for all respondents, 
possibly missing what is most appropriate to many respondents.  
• Surveys are inflexible in that they require the initial study design (the tool and 
administration of the tool) to remain unchanged throughout the data collection.  
• The researcher must ensure that a large number of the selected sample will 
reply.  
• It may be hard for participants to recall information or to tell the truth about a 
controversial question.  
 
3.3.2 Sampling Strategy 
 
A multi-stage sampling strategy was adopted for the study.  Small-scale commercial 
farms are scattered around the country in clusters.  These clusters are known locally 
as Intensive Conservation Areas (ICAs).  The study selected two ICAs (see figure 2 
below) - one under freehold tenure and another under leasehold / permit tenure 
which are adjacent to each other. Thus, travel costs between SSC areas were also 
greatly reduced.  Furthermore, these sites were in the same agro-ecological zone 
and therefore there are no obvious differences in soil types and climates. Within 
each selected ICA, the study selected a 58 percent random sample (57 farm units) of 
the total farm units with permit tenure and 34% (59 farm units) for farm units with 
freehold tenure.  Thus, the farm unit within each ICA was the secondary sampling 
unit. 
 
However, one possible limitation of the cluster sampling approach is that the 
characteristics and attitudes of farmers within each cluster or ICA may be too similar.  
Ideally, a cluster should be as heterogeneous as the population itself to allow for 
statistical inference. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of land by farming sector before land reform 
 
 
3.3.3 Data Needs and Questionnaire Design 
 
Primary data was collected to address the specific issues identified from the 
literature review.  From the literature review, the following issues have been 
identified for the study: 
 Does land tenure security affect farm infrastructure development and investment 
amongst SSC farmers in Zimbabwe?  In their study on the impact of land 
ownership security on farm investment and land improvements in Thailand, Feder 
and Onchan (1987) found that land-improving investments are significantly 
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affected by ownership security.  In two of the three provinces they studied, 
ownership security induces significantly higher capital/land ratios. 
 How does land tenure security affect farmers' access to credit? Some studies 
have shown that land ownership security enhances capital formation by providing 
better incentives and improved access to credit.  Because they imply a greater 
likelihood of repayment, improved tenure security may also increase lender 
willingness to offer credit, leading to easier financing of farm investments and 
inputs. 
 Does land tenure security affect farm productivity amongst SSC farms in 
Zimbabwe? Tenure security enhances long-term investments, which in turn 
enhance yields.  Tenure security provides farmers with adequate incentives or 
means to make land improvements or adopt new technologies that could 
enhance production efficiency (Parsons, 1971).  
 
The questionnaire (appendix 1) collected data from the following main areas: 
 Demographic questions for the head of household, spouse, and other household 
members.  The section contains questions that will capture data on the family 
size and composition, age of family members, nature of the household, education 
status of family members, and other related issues.   
 Information on land holding.  It contains questions that capture data on the total 
farm size, total arable area, total grazing area, type and quality of natural 
resource endowment, and other related issues. 
 Information on farm structure and land use. The questions will try and collect data 
on the different cropping enterprises and level of input use. 
 Marketing information. Questions in this section aim at collecting data on the 
various marketing arrangements used by the farmer for both inputs and farm 
output. 
 Information on livestock and other capital holdings.  Questions in this section was 
aimed at collected data on the farm’s major livestock enterprises, their size and 
production levels.  
 Information on farm planning.  This section will look at how the farming activities 
are financed, and in particular, if the farmer uses credit. 
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 Problems and constraints.  This section will contain questions that will seek to 
establish the problems that the farmers are experiencing.  It will also look at 
whether the farmer is leasing part of his farm to other users and also look at the 
conditions under which other users are allowed to cultivate. 
 
3.3.4 Data Analysis Procedures: A Model of Tenure Security, Investment, and 
Productivity 
 
After collecting the data, it was coded first before being loaded into SPSS.  Cleaning 
of the data was done first by running frequencies and secondly by a random check of 
ten percent of the entered questionnaires.  The study used an adapted version of a 
regression model developed by Feder, Onchan, Chalamwong, and Hongladaron 
(1988) to measure the effect of land tenure security on farm investment and 
productivity.  
 
Feder and Onchan (1987) formally developed Feder's framework of 
investment and tenure security as an optimization problem. Tenure insecurity is 
represented by the probability of being evicted from one’s land.  The farmer chooses 
between investments in capital equipment, which is not lost in the event of eviction; 
land improvements, which are completely lost in an eviction; and nonagricultural 
activities and assets, which are unaffected by eviction. The farmer invests in the first 
period and produces in the second with the objective of maximizing expected terminal 
wealth at the end of the second period. Terminal wealth consists of production value, 
land value, and returns to non-agricultural activities, less any debts incurred through 
credit use. The first conditions for maximum terminal wealth yield the following 
structural form equations used by Place and Hazell (1993): 
 
C = f(X, TS)        [1] 
L = f(X, TS, C)       [2] 
I = f(X, L, C)        [3] 
Y = f(X, L, I)        [4] 
 
Where the endogenous variables are:  
C is credit, 
L is land improvements 
I is variable inputs, and 
Y is yield (Y). 
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Tenure security (TS) is exogenous, and X represents exogenous characteristics of 
the farm and its cultivator(s). This system of equations is recursive in the sense of the 
model structure, not necessarily temporally.  That is, tenure security indirectly 
affects productivity through investment. 
 
Feder (1987) used this framework to examine the relationship between land title, 
yield, and inputs in three provinces in Thailand. Migot-Adholla, et. al. (1994), and 
Place and Hazell (1993) adopted a variation of Feder's system for their econometric 
work in Kenya, Ghana, and Rwanda. Their studies were innovative in their attempt to 
control for parcel, household, and village characteristics and for their use of 
lexicographic transfer rights bundles to create tenure categories. Roth, Cochrane, 
and Kisamba-Mugerwa (1993, 1994), in their study of Rukungiri District, Uganda, 
consider the role of title in promoting farm investments.  
 
Following Place and Hazell (1993), tenure security is measured based on whether a 
farmer has title deeds or a permit to their farm.  With freehold tenure (title deeds) the 
farmer has complete transfer rights (the right to sell the land), whereas with the 
permit system, the farmer only has use rights. The investments considered are 
grouped into three types: long-term or fixed improvements, (wells and fences), 
plantation crops, and medium-term soil improvements (soil and water conservation 
and fallowing). Long-and medium-term improvements are thought to be 
complementary, and both of these are considered to affect the use of variable inputs.  
The structural model employed here takes its inspiration from that of Place and 
Hazell (1993) and Migot-Adholla et. al. (1994), and can be written as the following 
system: 
 
L=f(X[sub 1], TS)       [5] 
T = f(X[sub 2], TS)       [6] 
M = f(X[sub 3], TS, L)       [7] 
I = f(X[sub 4], L, M)       [8] 
Y = f(X[sub 5], L, T, M, I)      [9] 
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where long-term improvements (L), the presence of trees (T), and medium-term soil 
improvements (M) are binary endogenous variables; commercial inputs (I) and yield 
(Y) are continuous endogenous variables; tenure security (TS) is exogenous; and 
the X's are exogenous explanatory variables included in each respective equation. 
 
Data from the survey is used to construct variables to estimate equations [10] to [14]: 
PLANT = α0 + α1HHEDUC + α2TRAINING + α3EXPERIENCE + α4FARMSIZE + 
α5TENURE + α6EXTENSION +µ0  
[10] 
LONGT = β0 + β1HHEDUC + β2TRAINING + β3EXPERIENCE + β4FARMSIZE + 
β5TENURE + β6EXTENSION + β7CREDIT + β8NFINCOM + β9RIVER + 
β10OUTVALUE + β11 IRRIGAREA + β12 MIDTERM + µ1  
[11] 
MIDTERM = δ0 + δ1HHEDUC + δ2TRAINING + δ3EXPERIENCE + δ4FARMSIZE + 
δ5TENURE + δ6EXTENSION + δ7CREDIT + δ8NFINCOM + δ9OUTVALUE + 
δ10DRAFT + µ2  
[12] 
TVCHA = ∂0 + ∂1HHEDUC + ∂2MIDTERM +  ∂3SEXFARM + ∂4EXTENSION + 
∂5LONGT + ∂6TRAINING + ∂7NFINCOM + ∂8ARABLE + ∂9RELATIVE + µ3 
[13] 
YIELDHA = σ0 + σ1HHEDUC + σ2MIDTERM + σ3TVCHA + σ5SEXFARM + σ6PLANT 
+ σ7EXTENSION + σ8LONGT + σ9FARMSIZE + µ4 
[14] 
CREDIT = δ0 + δ1HHEDUC + δ2AGEHHH + δ3 LONGT + δ4FARMSIZE + δ5TENURE 
+ δ6EXTENSION + δ7PLANT + µ5  
[15] 
 
Where the variable definitions are presented in Table 4 below: 
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Table 4: Land Tenure Econometric Model Variable Description 
Variable Variable Description 
PLANT farmer has at least a plantation crop (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
HHHEDUC education level of farm owner; 
AGEHHH Age of household head (years) 
TRAINING farmer received formal agricultural training (1 = yes, 0 = 
otherwise); 
EXPERIENCE number of years farming; 
FARMSIZE total farm size (ha); 
TENURE tenure type (1 = freehold, 0 = leasehold); 
EXTENSION farmer receive agricultural extension services (1 = yes, 0 = 
otherwise); 
CREDIT farmer has access to credit (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
NFINCOM non-farm income (Z$); 
RIVER farmer has access to a river for irrigation (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
OUTVALUE value of annual total farm production/output (Z$); 
IRRIGAREA current area under irrigation (ha); 
MIDTERM farmer has mid-term investments, i.e. soil and soil water 
conservation, manuring, (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
LONGT farmer has long-term investments, i.e. irrigation infrastructure, 
buildings, paddocks, fencing, (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
DRAFT farmer has access to draft power (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
YIELDHA value of annual total farm production/output per hectare (Z$/ha); 
TVCHA annual total variable costs per hectare (Z$/ha), 
SEXFARM sex of farm owner; 
ARABLE total farm arable land (ha); 
RELATIVE farmer receive money from relatives who live away from the farm 
(1 = yes, 0 = otherwise). 
 
Equations [10] to [12], specifying the relationships between tenure security, 
investment, input use, and yield, were estimated using LIMDEP.  Probit analysis was 
used to estimate the equations coefficients. Equations [13] and [14] were estimated 
using multiple regression analysis technique – ordinary least squares (OLS). 
 
From equation [10], it is expected that a priori, the probability that a farmer grows at 
least one plantation crop increases with farm size and when a household has 
freehold tenure.  As farm size increases, there is enough land to produce both 
plantation and other crops.  With freehold tenure, the rights to access to land are 
secure, hence a farmer is likely to make long-term investments in “fixed” assets like 
plantation crops.  The effect on investing in plantation crops of the education level of 
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household head, formal training in agriculture, experience and access to extension 
services can not be determined a priori. 
  
From equation [11], the probability of making long-term investments in buildings, 
irrigation infrastructure, and paddocks is expected to increase with an increase in the 
education level of household head, agricultural training, farming experience, access 
to credit, non-farm income, output value, the area under irrigation, and mid-term 
investments.  It is assumed that those with experience and education are more likely 
to know the value of infrastructure investment and would also be considered a lower 
credit risk. A priori, the probability of making long-term investments (especially in 
irrigation facilities) is likely to decrease if a farmer has direct access to irrigation 
water from the river.  Furthermore, it is assumed that a farmer with freehold tenure is 
likely to make greater long-term investments than a farmer with a permit.  
 
From equation [12], investments in soil conservation are likely to increase with an 
increase in the level of farmer education, formal training in agriculture, farming 
experience, access to extension services, access to credit, non-farm income, value 
of agriculture output and access to draft power.  The probability of making medium 
term investments is like to be higher under freehold tenure than under the permit 
system.  The effect of farm size on the probability of making medium-term 
investments cannot be determined a priori. 
 
From equation [13], the total variable costs per hectare are expected to increase with 
an increase non-farm income, and income from relatives.  The effect of the other 
variables in the equation on TVCHA cannot be determined a priori. From equation 
[14], the value of output per hectare is expected to increase with an increase in the 
level of education of owner farmer, mid-term investments, TVCHA, production of 
plantation crops, access to extension services, and long-term investments.  Ceteris 
paribus, YIELDHA is expected to decrease with an increase in farm size.  As farm 
size increases, the efficiency in the use of land decreases, hence a decrease in 
YIELDHA. 
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From equation [15], the probability of accessing credit is expected to be higher with 
security of tenure, i.e. under freehold tenure, than under leasehold tenure.  The 
probability of accessing credit is expected a priori to increase with an increase in the 
level of education and age of the owner farmer, long-term investments, access to 
extension services, ownership of plantation crops, and an increase in farm size. 
 
3.4 Survey Administration 
 
During the survey stage, assistance was sought from a team of two enumerators 
who were responsible for administering the questionnaire to the sample farmers. 
These enumerators were trained before being assigned to the field and were also 
participants in pilot testing the draft questionnaire. Table 5 shows the time schedule 
of the various activities that were carried out during the data collection stage. 
 
Table 5: Schedule of Activities for Data Collection  
Activity Date of completion 
Sampling – selection of two ICAs and 
study sample 
Mid June 2006 
Training of two enumerators Third week, July 2007 
Finalization of the questionnaire and 
pilot testing 
End July 2007 
Introduction of study to local authorities Mid August 2007 
Field data collection End November 2007 
Data assembly, capturing, and analysis January 2008 
 
 
3.5 Limitations of the Study 
 
In carrying out this study, it is acknowledged that there are other factors that affect 
productivity that this study may not have been captured within the available time.  
Another possible limitation of the study could result from the sampling strategy.  A 
problem may arise with cluster sampling if the characteristics and attitudes of the 
farmers within the cluster are too similar. Increasing the number of clusters for the 
study and reducing the number of farms selected within a cluster may mitigate this 
problem. 
 
Farmers may also have problems in recalling past production data.  They may also 
not be willing to share their farm production data and they may under report on the 
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various activities.  This problem was addressed by fully explaining to the sample 
farmers the purpose of the study, by ensuring maximum confidentiality and also by 
respecting the respondent’s right to privacy.  
 
3.6 Ethical Considerations 
 
There are a number of ethical issues that were considered during the research study 
such as: 
o The respondent’s right to be informed about the purpose of research.  Before 
collecting information and data from the sample farmers, each farmer was 
thoroughly briefed on the purpose of the research and the study sought the 
farmer’s agreement to participate in the study. The study did not deceive 
farmers into participating in the study by promising them rewards.  Thus, the 
study explained to the farmers the exact purpose of the study and requested 
them to decide on whether to participate or not. 
o The respondent’s right to privacy.  Farmer’s right to privacy was respected by 
interviewing each of the sample farmers in their homesteads and by 
maintaining confidentiality throughout the process. 
o Confidentiality was achieved by assigning a code to every questionnaire.  
Thus, farmers’ names and farm names were not referred to during the 
analysis and reporting phases of the study.  Only questionnaire codes were 
used.  Also, information from any farmer was not to be shared with any other 
person. 
o Throughout the study, honesty and objectivity in both data collection and data 
reporting were strictly adhered to. 
 
3.7 Summary 
 
This chapter presented the main research methodology that was used for this 
research data.  The chapter first discussed the research paradigm that was used for 
the study.  It then went on to discuss the detailed research procedures covering such 
issues like research design, sampling strategy, data collection methods, data needs, 
data analysis procedures and survey administration.  This is followed by a discussion 
of the limitations of the study and the main ethical considerations for the study. 
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The study used an adapted version of a regression model developed by Feder, 
Onchan, Chalamwong, and Hongladaron (1988) to measure the effect of land tenure 
security on farm investment and productivity. Feder and Onchan (1987) formally 
developed Feder's framework of investment and tenure security as an 
optimization problem. Feder (1987) used this framework to examine the relationship 
between land title, yield, and inputs in three provinces in Thailand. Migot-Adholla, et. 
al. (1994), and Place and Hazell (1993) adopted a variation of Feder's system for 
their econometric work in Kenya, Ghana, and Rwanda. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter presents the descriptive analysis of the study findings.  The descriptive 
analysis aims at assessing if there are any differences in the level and type of 
investment on the farm by tenure system. Chi Square statistical tests are used to 
identify significant correlations 
 
4.2 General Farm Owner Characteristics 
 
For both forms of tenure, about 85% are male owned whilst about 15% are female 
owned.  The majority of farm owners with leasehold tenure are resident farm owners 
(59.6%), whilst the majority of farm owners with freehold tenure are non-resident 
(61%).  This result is contrary to a priori expectations.  The expectation is farmers 
with freehold tenure will be more committed to managing their own farms and more 
likely to invest in permanent fixtures and hence would have a higher residence 
percentage.  
 
An analysis by gender of farm owner shows that: 
i. male owned farms under leasehold tenure are mostly with resident owners 
(about 61%) whilst the majority of male owned farms under title deed 
tenure are mostly with non-resident owners (Table 6). 
ii. About 50% of female owned farms under permit tenure are with resident 
owners whilst about 56% of farms under freehold tenure are with non-
resident owners. 
Table 6: Residence of Farm Owner by Sex by tenure system, Percent (n = 116) 
Type of tenure Sex of 
registered farm 
owner 
 Residence 
Leasehold Freehold 
Male  Resident 61.2 38.0 
  Non-resident  38.8 62.0 
Female  Resident 50.0 44.4 
  Non-resident  50.0 55.6 
Source: Survey, 2007 
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Farm owners were asked about their management arrangements for their farms.  
The results are presented in Table 7. At least 74% of the farms under the two 
(freehold and Leasehold) tenure types are the sole farm managers. About 15% of 
the farmers under freehold co-manage the farms with their relatives.  A priori it is 
expected that the level of investment on a farm is higher with sole management 
compared to other forms of management. 
     
Table 7: Farm Management Arrangement by tenure system, Percent (n= 116) 
Type of tenure Significance Tests  Farm Management 
Arrangement  Leasehold Freehold Pearson Chi-
Square 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2 sided) 
Sole manager 89.5 74.6 4.340 0.037* 
Co-manager with family 7.0 8.5 0.086 0.769 
Co-manager with 
relatives (brothers) 
3.5 15.3 4.660 0.031* 
Employ farm manager  1.7 0.975 0.324 
Source:  Survey, 2007 
 
Table 8 shows that at least 73 percent of the farm owners under both types of tenure 
did not receive any formal agricultural training.  The percentage of farmers without 
any formal training is significantly higher for those under leasehold tenure.  The 
percentage of farmers with a certificate or with vocational training is significantly 
higher for those under freehold tenure. 
 
Table 8: Level of formal agricultural training by tenure system, Percent (n=116)  
Type of tenure 
 
Significance Tests  Level of formal 
agricultural 
training 
  
Leasehold Freehold Pearson Chi-
Square 
Asymp. Sig. (2 
sided) 
No training 87.7 72.9 4.015. 0.045* 
Master farmer 5.3 1.7 1.109 0.292 
Certificate  6.9 4.002 0.045* 
Diploma 3.5 3.4 0.001 0.972 
Degree 1.8 3.4 0.308 0.579 
vocational 
training 
1.8 10.3 3.621 0.057 
Source: Survey, 2007 
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4.3 Land Holding and Land Cultivation 
 
On average, the mean area under freehold tenure is about three times that under 
leasehold tenure (Table 9).  A priori it is expected that as farm size increases, 
farmers are able to invest into rotational grazing, woodlots, and fallow land. 
 
Table 9: Mean landholding by land use by tenure system (ha)  
 Type of tenure   total arable  total grazing 
area 
Idle land Total land 
 Leasehold 8.518 5.333 5.825 12.509 
 Freehold 24.127 10.069 9.759 36.092 
Total 16.457 8.490 8.153 24.503 
t-value -5.419 -3.798 -1.969 -6.334 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Source: Survey, 2007 
 
All farmers with freehold tenure bought their land (for cash) whilst all farmers with 
leasehold tenure were allocated their land by the government.  None of the farmers 
inherited their land nor were given land as a gift by other family members. None of 
the farmers under both leasehold and freehold tenure have sold or permanently 
transferred any of their holdings to other farmers in the past 10 years.  Thus there is 
no farm fragmentation.   None of the farmers under either tenure types have leased 
outland to other farmers in 2005. 
 
About 32% and 39% of farmers under leasehold and freehold tenure respectively 
cultivated all their arable land in 2005.  The main reasons for not cultivating all the 
arable land include (Table 10) (a) lack of labour (82%); (b) lack of inputs to cultivate 
all the land (82%); and lack of draft power (47%).  The percentage of farmers 
indicating that old age is the main reason for not cultivating all the arable land in 
2005 is significantly higher for farmers under freehold tenure. 
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Table 10: Reasons for not cultivating the total arable land area by tenure system 
Type of tenure (% of 
respondents) (n=116) 
Significance 
Tests 
 
Reason for not cultivating  
leasehold Freehold 
Total 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2 
sided) 
Lack of labour  77.5 86.1 81.6 0.935 0.334 
Old age 2.5 38.9 19.7 15.838 0.000** 
Lack of inputs to plant total area 77.5 86.1 81.6 0.935 0.334 
Lack of draft power 45.0 50.0 47.4 0.190 0.663 
Sickness 17.5 19.4 18.4 0.048 0.827 
Fallow land as part of crop rotation 7.5 11.1 9.2 0.295 0.587 
Source:  Survey, 2007 
 
Under both tenure systems, the main cropping season for all farmers is summer.  
This is an indicator that none of the farmers have invested in irrigation facilities for 
dry season cropping. 
 
4.4 Level of Farm Mechanization 
 
Table 11 shows that the percentage farmers under freehold tenure using their own 
draft power (either tractor or draft animals) is significantly higher than that of farmers 
under leasehold tenure.  However, the high percentage of hand hoe use by both 
categories of farmers shows the low level of farm mechanization under both tenure 
types. 
 
Table 11: Land Preparation Methods by tenure system 
Type of tenure(% of 
respondents) (n=116) 
  
Significance Tests  
Land Preparation Method  
 leasehold  Freehold 
Total 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2 
sided) 
hired tractor 12.3 16.9 14.7 0.505 0.477 
Own tractor 5.4 15.3 10.4 3.011 0.083 
hired draft animals 28.1 23.7 25.9 0.285 0.593 
Hoes 82.5 84.7 83.6 0.111 0.739 
Own draft animals 29.8 55.9 43.1 8.058 0.005** 
Source:  Survey, 2007 
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4.5 Crop Production 
 
An analysis of the crop enterprises by tenure type shows that the percentage of 
farmers growing annual food crops (maize, sweet potato, sorghum, rapoko) is higher 
under the leasehold tenure system (Table 12).  The percentage of farmers with 
plantation crops (tea, gum tree, macadamia nuts, banana, coffee, citrus fruits, and 
avocado) are significantly higher under freehold tenure.  The percentage of farmers 
growing cash crops (beans, sunflower, groundnut, vegetables, tomato, Irish potato, 
pop corn, soya bean) is similar under both tenure systems. This result seems to 
show that under secure tenure system, farmers are likely to have long-term 
investments, in this case in plantation crops. 
 
Table 12: Percent of Farmers Indicating Crop Enterprises by tenure system (n=116) 
Type of tenure Significance Test Crops 
  Leasehold  freehold 
Total 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
Asymp. Sig. (2 
sided) 
Annual food crops 96.5 79.7 87.9 7.738 0.005** 
Annual cash crops 22.8 25.4 24.1 0.108 0.742 
Plantation crops 3.5 42.4 23.3 24.520 0.000** 
Source:  Survey, 2007 
 
4.6 Livestock Ownership 
 
The mostly held types of livestock, in order of decreasing importance, are poultry, 
goats, and cattle (Table 13).  The percentage of farmers owning all livestock types 
except poultry is significantly higher under freehold tenure than under leasehold 
tenure.  This result seems to suggest that investment in livestock is associated with 
secure tenure systems.  However, Table 14 shows that on average, a farmer under 
the leasehold tenure systems holds more poultry than a farmer under the freehold 
tenure whilst a farmer under freehold tenure holds more goats than a farmer under 
leasehold tenure.  For the rest of the livestock, the mean holdings are not statistically 
different under both tenure types.  Table 15 shows that the number of livestock 
owned has been mainly decreasing over the past five years for farmers under the 
freehold whilst it has been mainly increasing for farmers under the leasehold tenure 
system.  In light of these results, it may be concluded that the type of tenure system 
may not necessarily influence an investment in non-fixed assets like livestock. 
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Table 13: Percent of Farmers owning Livestock by tenure system (n=116) 
Type of tenure Total Significance Test  Establishment 
Period 
  
Leasehold Freehold  Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2 sided) 
Cattle 42.1 59.3 50.9 3.438 0.064 
Sheep 1.8 10.2 6.0 3.621 0.057 
Goats 50.9 66.1 58.6 2.770 0.096 
Pigs 1.8 30.5 16.4 17.501 0.000** 
Poultry 75.4 88.1 81.9 3.152 0.76 
Donkeys 1.8 10.2 6.0 3.621 0.057 
Source:  Survey, 2007 
 
 
Table 14: Mean Livestock Holding by tenure system  
Type of tenure Total Significance Test Variable 
Leasehold Freehold  T-value Sig. 
Total number of 
cattle 
4.79 5.86 5.42 -1.029 0.308 
Total number of 
sheep 
2.50 4.66 4.12 -1.748 0.131 
Total number of 
goats 
6.31 10.53 8.73 -2.525 0.014* 
Total number of 
pigs 
6.00 3.67 3.79 0.415 0.683 
Total number of 
poultry 
24.12 17.73 20.62 2.140 0.035* 
Total number of 
donkeys 
5.00 2.17 2.57 1.782 0.135 
Source:  Survey, 2007 
 
 
Table 15: Percent indicating stock variation over the last 5 years by tenure system  
Type of tenure Total Significance Test Nature of stock 
variation  
  
Leasehold Freehold  Pearson Chi-
Square 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2 sided) 
stock numbers
reduced 
25.0 56.4 41.7 12.23 0.000** 
stock numbers
increased 
64.6 30.9 46.6 7.816 0.005** 
stock numbers 
stayed the same 
10.4 12.7 11.7 0.299 0.585 
Source:  Survey, 2007 
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4.7 Asset Ownership 
 
Table 16 shows the percentage farmers owning agricultural equipment by type of 
tenure system.  The percentage of farmers owning agricultural equipment is 
significantly higher under the freehold tenure system for ploughs, cultivators, 
harrows, tractors, cars, and wheelbarrows.  However, the mean agricultural 
equipment asset ownership is similar under both tenure systems (Table 17) but the 
mean numbers of major cultivation items are significantly higher under the freehold 
tenure system. 
 
Table 16: Percent Farmers Owning Assets by tenure system (n=116)  
Type of tenure Total Significance 
Test 
Type of asset 
Leasehold Freehold  Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2 
sided) 
Plough 31.6 72.9 52.6 19.835 0.000** 
Cultivator 7.0 40.7 24.1 17.938 0.000** 
Planter 1.8 1.7 1.7 0.001 0.980 
Harrow 3.5 37.3 20.7 20.160 0.000** 
Maize Sheller 1.8 5.1 3.4 0.966 0.326 
Maize Grinder  3.4 1.7 1.966 0.161 
Hoes 93.0 93.2 93.1 0.003 0.960 
Tractor 3.5 18.6 11.2 6.674 0.010* 
Cart 14.0 42.4 28.4 11.437 0.001** 
Bicycle 36.8 35.6 36.2 0.020 0.889 
Car 7.0 13.6 10.3 1.338 0.247 
Truck 3.5 11.9 7.8 2.828 0.093 
Lorry 1.8 3.4 2.6 0.308 0.579 
Motorbike  1.7 .9 0.975 0.324 
Wheelbarrow 5.3 23.7 14.7 7.904 0.005* 
Machette 1.8 1.7 1.7 0.001 0.980 
Slasher 1.8 1.7 1.7 0.001 0.980 
Source:  Survey, 2007 
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Table 17: Mean assets owned by farmers by tenure system 
Type of tenure Total Significance 
Test 
 Type of asset 
Leasehold Freehold  T value Sig. 
Cultivator 1.00 1.42 1.30 0.389 0.70 
Harrow 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.428 0.673 
Hoes  1.50 1.50 -1.636 0.105 
Tractor 7.09 8.76 7.94 -0.607 0.556 
Cart 1.00 2.45 2.23 1.691 0.101 
Bicycle 1.38 1.08 1.15 -2.340 0.024* 
Car 1.24 1.81 1.52 -0.690 0.506 
Truck 1.00 1.13 1.08 -0.789 0.456 
Wheelbarrow  1.00 1.00 -1.685 0.119 
Plough 1.00 3.00 2.00 -2.665 0.010* 
Source:  Survey, 2007 
 
Besides an investment in plantation crops, an analysis was made of the extent to 
which farmers make fixed investments like fencing7, piped water and woodlots under 
different tenure systems.  Under the freehold tenure system the chances of investing 
in fencing and woodlots is higher than under the leasehold tenure system (Table 18).  
Thus secure tenure is likely to influence investment in fixed assets. 
 
Table 18: Percent Farmers Indicating Presence of Infrastructure by tenure system  
Type of tenure Total Significance Test Variable 
Leasehold Freehold  Pearson 
Chi-Square 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2 sided) 
Fencing 29.8 45.8 37.9 3.128 0.077 
Piped water 3.5 8.5 6.0 1.261 0.262 
Woodlot 7.0 88.1 48.3 76.398 0.000** 
Source:  Survey, 2007 
 
The percentage of farmers investing in animal handling facilities like kraals, fowl 
runs, and paddocks, is similar under both tenure systems (Table 19). However, the 
percentage farmers investing in pig sty is higher for farmers under the freehold 
tenure system. 
 
                                                           
7
 Fencing is mostly for boundary fencing (77.3% of the farmers), then boundary fencing and paddocks (15.9%) 
and for paddocks only (6.8%). 
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Table 19: Percent farmers indicating animal handling facilities developed by tenure 
system  
Type of tenure Total 
 
Significance Test Type of 
animal 
handling 
facility  
Leasehold Freehold  Pearson Chi-
Square 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2 sided) 
Kraal 33.3 44.1 38.8 1.407 0.236 
Fowl run 15.8 15.3 15.5 0.006 0.937 
Paddocks 3.5 6.8 5.2 0.632 0.426 
Pig Sty  11.9 6.0 7.197 0.007* 
Source:  Survey, 2007 
 
Table 20 shows that the percentage of farmers investing in pole and dagga housing 
facilities is significantly higher for farmers under the leasehold tenure whilst the 
percentage farmers investing in brick houses is significantly higher under the 
freehold tenure system.  Thus, the results seem to indicate that secure tenure is 
likely to positively influence an investment in permanent housing facilities.  Similarly 
security of tenure does seem to influence an investment in infrastructure like 
granaries and toilets (Table 21). 
 
Table 20: Percent owning type of housing by tenure system (n=116)  
Type of tenure 
 
Total 
 
Significance 
Test 
Type of 
housing  
  Leasehold Freehold  Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2 
sided) 
Pole and dagga 93.0 39.0 65.5 37.419 0.000** 
Brick house 8.8 91.5 50.9 79.438 0.000** 
Source: Survey, 2007 
 
 
Table 21: Percent farmers owning other housing structures by tenure system  
Type of tenure Total Significance 
Test 
Other Housing 
Structures  
  Leasehold Freehold  Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2 
sided) 
Granary 82.5 98.3 90.5 8.484 0.004* 
Garage 1.8 8.5 5.2 2.669 0.102 
Toilets  5.1 2.6 2.975 0.085 
Shade 1.8 3.4 2.6 0.308 0.579 
Workshop 3.5 1.7 2.6 0.379 0.538 
Source: Survey, 2007 
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4.8 Farm Infrastructure Improvements 
 
Under both freehold and leasehold tenure systems, farmers made improvements to 
existing infrastructure upon acquisition of the farms.  About 90 percent of the farmers 
under both tenure systems made some improvements to existing infrastructure upon 
acquisition (Table 22).  Overall, the percentage of farmers making improvements to 
existing farm infrastructure is higher under the freehold tenure system than the 
leasehold tenure system.  The percentage farmers making investments in 
infrastructure improvement is significantly higher under the freehold system for 
ridges and trees.  Thus secure tenure seems to be associated with a higher 
propensity to invest in improving existing farm infrastructure. 
 
The sources of finance for farm infrastructure improvements is mainly from own 
savings (Table 23).  However, the investments from own savings is significantly 
higher under the leasehold tenure system. 
 
Table 22: Percent farmers indicating farm infrastructure improvements by tenure 
system (n=116) 
Type of tenure 
 
Significance Test  Farm 
Infrastructure 
Improvement 
  
Leasehold Freehold
 
Overall 
 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
Asymp. Sig. (2 
sided) 
Irrigation 1.8 5.1 3.4 0.966 0.326 
Drainage 15.8 23.7 19.8 1.150 0.284 
Borders 22.8 23.7 23.3 0.014 0.907 
Ridges 37.5 59.3 48.7 5.476 0.019 
Trees 54.4 84.7 69.8 12.683 0.000** 
Building 68.4 78.0 73.3 1.349 0.245 
Fences 22.8 33.9 28.4 1.752 0.186 
None 10.5 10.2 10.3 0.004 0.950 
Source: Survey, 2007 
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Table 23: Source of improvements financing by tenure system  
Type of tenure 
 
 
Significance Test Source of 
financing  
  
Leasehold Freehold Overall Pearson Chi-
Square 
Asymp. Sig. (2 
sided) 
Credit 5.7 34.6 20.0 12.462 0.000 
Savings 94.3 65.4 80.0 13.142 0.000 
Source: Survey, 2007 
 
 
That farmers mostly rely on their own savings to make farm investments is confirmed 
with only 14 percent and 3.4 percent of the farmers under leasehold tenure and 
freehold tenure respectively borrowed money during the last five seasons to finance 
any of their farm operations – i.e. purchasing inputs.  Some of the reasons for not 
using credit for farm operations include: (i) a lack of knowledge on the sources of 
credit (42%), (ii) No collateral security (15%), (iii) use of own money/savings (12%), 
and (iv) being afraid of risk (9%). 
 
 
4.9 Remittances 
 
About 58 percent of the farmers under the freehold tenure system and 33 percent of 
the farmers under the leasehold tenure system receive money from relatives who 
live away from the farm (within and outside Zimbabwe).  About 16 percent of the 
farmers under leasehold tenure and about 64 percent of the farmers under freehold 
tenure receive the remittances during the farming season (Table 24).  Thus, the 
remittances from relatives are an important source of short term farm input financing, 
especially under the freehold tenure system. 
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Table 24:  Frequency with which remittances are received by tenure system 
(Percent farmers) (n=116) 
Type of tenure 
 
Significance Test Frequency 
Leasehold Freehold Overrall Pearson 
Chi-Square 
Asymp. Sig. (2 
sided) 
During 
farming 
season 
15.8 63.6 46.2 16.253 0.000** 
Upon 
request 
42.1 27.3 32.7 0.034 0.853 
Monthly 26.3 6.1 13.5 1.481 0.224 
After every 
two months 
15.8 3.0 7.7 1.109 0.292 
Source: Survey, 2007 
 
 
4.10 Access to Extension Services 
 
About 75 percent of the farmers under the leasehold tenure system and about 86 
percent of the farmers under the freehold tenure system have access to agricultural 
extension services.  The most important source of extension support is AREX 
followed by input suppliers (Table 25). The percentage of farmers getting extension 
services through farmer associations is significantly higher under freehold tenure 
system whilst the percentage of farmers getting extension services through input 
suppliers is significantly higher under the leasehold tenure system. The major type of 
extension support is in production planning (85 percent of the farmers), and then 
agricultural policy (19 percent of the farmers). 
 
Table 25: Percent farmers indicating major sources of extension support by tenure 
system (n=116) 
Type of tenure 
 
Significance Test Source of 
Extension 
Support Leasehold Freehold Overall Pearson Chi-
Square 
Asymp. Sig. (2 
sided) 
AREX 100.0 98.0 98.9 0.852 0.356 
Private 2.3 2.0 2.1 0.015 0.903 
Farmer 
Associations
2.3 13.7 8.5 3.894 0.048 
Input 
Suppliers 
20.9  9.6 11.805 0.001 
Source: Survey, 2007 
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4.11 Summary 
 
The majority of farm owners with leasehold tenure are resident farm owners (59.6%), 
whilst the majority of farm owners with freehold tenure are non-resident (61%).  At 
least 74% of the farms under both tenure types are the sole farm managers. About 
16% of the farmers under freehold co-manage the farms with their relatives.   At 
least 74 percent of the farm owners under both types of tenure did not receive any 
formal agricultural training.  The percentage of farmers without any formal training is 
higher for those under leasehold tenure. 
 
Under both tenure systems, the main cropping season for all farmers is summer.  
This is an indicator that none of the farmers have invested in irrigation facilities for 
dry season cropping.  The results also show that under both tenure systems the level 
of farm mechanization is very low as evidenced by the high use of hand hoes, 
although the freeholders tend to have more cultivation equipment.  
 
Focusing on the effect of tenure security on farm investment, the following 
conclusions are drawn from the results: 
(a) Under secure tenure system, farmers are likely to have long-term 
investments, in this case in plantation crops 
(b) The type of tenure system may not necessarily influence an investment in 
non-fixed assets like livestock. 
(c) Secure tenure is likely to influence investment in fixed assets like fencing  and 
woodlots. 
(d) Secure tenure is likely to positively influence an investment in permanent 
housing facilities.  Security of tenure does not seem to influence an investment in 
infrastructure like garages, workshops or shades. 
(e) Secure tenure seems to be associated with a higher propensity to invest in 
improving existing farm infrastructure.  The sources of finance for farm 
infrastructure improvements is mainly from own savings. 
(f) Remittances from relatives are an important source of short term farm input 
financing and long term farm investments. 
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The results of this chapter indicate that leasehold and freehold properties are 
structurally different, in terms of scale of operation, farm management arrangements, 
crop production practices, animal types, level of mechanization and asset ownership. 
The following chapter looks at whether there is also a difference in investment, use 
of commercial variable inputs and farm productivity.  
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CHAPTER 5 – AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF TENURE 
SECURITY ON FARM INVESTMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results of the linkages between tenure security and 
productivity obtained by estimating probit models which allows explicit testing of the 
impact of tenure security on productivity through its role on investment. These tests 
are based on consistent and the most asymptotically efficient coefficient estimates.    
Data include household, plot manager, and plot-level characteristics, and explicit 
account is taken of the relationships between tenure security and the choice 
variables measuring land investments, variable input use, and yield. Some of the 
hypothesized positive relationships between tenure security, investment, and yields 
are corroborated by the analysis. In particular, positive relationships are observed 
between tenure, the propensity to make long-term land improvements, and the 
presence of plantation crops on the farm.  Long-term land improvements are found 
to enhance yield. 
 
5.2 Investment and Land Tenure Security 
 
One of the major hypotheses of this study is that farmers with a more secure tenure 
are likely to have higher levels of investment compared to farmers with less secure 
tenure.  This is because farmers with more secure land rights may have a higher 
probability of recouping the benefits from land improvements and thus will be more 
inclined to make medium- or long-term land improvements and to use 
complementary yield-increasing inputs. To test this hypothesis, the study looked at 
whether tenure security influences investment in plantation crops, long-term farm 
investments and medium-term farm investments. 
 
5.2.1 Land tenure security and investment in plantation crops 
 
To assess the relationship between land tenure security and investment in plantation 
crops, the following econometric model was estimated. 
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PLANT = α0 + α1HHEDUC + α2TRAINING + α3EXPERIENCE + α4FARMSIZE + 
α5TENURE + α6EXTENSION +µ0  
 
Where: 
PLANT is farmer has at least a plantation crop (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
HHHEDUC is education level of farm owner (); 
TRAINING is farmer received formal agricultural training (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
EXPERIENCE is number of years farming; 
FARMSIZE is total farm size (ha); 
TENURE is tenure type (1 = freehold, 0 = leasehold); 
EXTENSION is farmer receive agricultural extension services (1 = yes, 0 = 
otherwise) 
 
The model correctly predicts the presence of plantation crops 76.7% of the time, with 
a majority in each category correct (Table 26). Freehold tenure, representing secure 
tenure, is positively and significantly associated with finding plantation crops on a 
given farm. 
 
As expected a priori, the presence of plantation crops on a farm is positively and 
significantly affected by farm size.  The larger the farm, the more farmers can afford 
to put some of the land under plantation crops.  Conversely, farmers with small farms 
cannot afford to grow plantation crops.  Thus, farmers with more land can afford to 
hold some of it in plantation crops rather than in higher-density crops or they may opt 
to hold more of it in plantation crops, which require less intensive labor application 
than most other crops.  
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Table 26: Probit Model Results for Investment in Plantation Crops  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error b/St.Er.| P[|Z|>z] 
Constant -0.06211064481 0.44437886 -0.140 0.8888 
HHHEDUC -0.06821360485 0.10619887 -0.642 0.5207 
TRAINING -0.09592900050 0.38825284 -0.247 0.8048 
EXPERIENCE 0.01552383072 0.015142763 1.025 0.3053 
FARMSIZE 0.01982292026 0.010532733 1.882 0.0598 
TENURE 0.9955232030 0.40475149 2.460* 0.0139 
EXTENSION -0.4364111704 0.34139847 -1.278 0.2011 
*significant at 0.05 and ** significant at 0.01 
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
 
        Predicted 
------  ----------  +  ----- 
Actual      0    1  |  Total 
------  ----------  +  ----- 
  0        32   10   |     42 
  1        17   57   |     74 
------  ----------  +  ----- 
Total      49   67 |    116 
 
 
The education level of owner farmer, agricultural training, and access to extension 
services all has negative coefficients.  However, these are statistically insignificant. 
Farming experience, ceteris paribus, does not significantly affect the probability of 
whether a farmer produces plantation crops or not.  
 
5.2.2 Long-Term Investments 
 
The following econometric model was estimated to assess the relationship between 
tenure security and long-term farm investments. 
 
LONGT = β0 + β1HHEDUC + β2TRAINING + β3EXPERIENCE + β4FARMSIZE + 
β5TENURE + β6EXTENSION + β7CREDIT + β8NFINCOM + β9RIVER + 
β10OUTVALUE + β11 IRRIGAREA + β12 MIDTERM + µ1  
 
Where: 
 
LONGT is farmer has long-term investments, i.e. irrigation infrastructure, buildings, 
paddocks, fencing, (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
HHHEDUC is education level of farm owner (); 
TRAINING is farmer received formal agricultural training (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
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EXPERIENCE is number of years farming; 
FARMSIZE is total farm size (ha); 
TENURE is tenure type (1 = freehold, 0 = leasehold); 
EXTENSION is farmer receive agricultural extension services (1 = yes, 0 = 
otherwise); 
CREDIT is farmer has access to credit (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
NFINCOM is non-farm income (Z$??); 
RIVER is farmer has access to a river for irrigation (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
OUTVALUE is value of annual total farm production/output (Z$);  
IRRIGAREA is current area under irrigation (ha); 
MIDTERM is farmer has mid-term investments, i.e. soil and soil water conservation, 
manuring, (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
  
The long-term improvements equation shows a very good fit, as measured by 
prediction accuracy. The model correctly predicts 91.1% of the dependent variable, 
with a majority in each category correctly predicted (as shown by the frequencies of 
actual and predicted outcomes below Table 27). The model's parameter estimates 
are presented in Table 27. 
 65 
Table 27: Probit Model Results for Long-Term Farm Investments  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error b/St.Er.| P[|Z|>z] 
Constant 0.3059205411 1.0003933 0.306 0.7598 
HHHEDUC -0.1200342576 0.17082774 -0.703 0.4823 
TRAINING 8.189472028 172379.45 0.000 1.0000 
EXPERIENCE 0.1133002165E-01 0.064003152 0.177 0.8595 
FARMSIZE -.4849180701E-01 0.026625347 -1.821 0.0686 
TENURE 2.509895244 1.1835623 2.121* 0.0340 
EXTENSION -0.4930298418 0.65310316 -0.755 0.4503 
CREDIT 0.8007417133 0.73134172 1.095 0.2736 
NFINCOM -0.4284850748 0.51461524 -0.833 0.4051 
RIVER 1.066164537 0.76525136 1.393 0.1636 
OUTVALUE 0.1359121725E-04 0.000053345835 2.548* 0.0108 
IRRIGATION 0.2613208045E-01 0.042749524 0.611 0.5410 
MIDTERM 0.3139229558 0.68727137 0.457 0.6478 
 *significant at 0.05 and **significant at 0.01 
 
 
 
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
 
         Predicted 
------  ----------  +  ----- 
Actual      0    1  |  Total 
------  ----------  +  ----- 
  0           7    7   |     14 
  1          3   96   |     99 
------  ----------  +  ----- 
Total   10  103  |    113 
 
 
Secure tenure, represented by freehold tenure, positively and significantly affects the 
propensity to make long-term investments – buildings, irrigation infrastructure, and 
paddocks. The coefficient for experience in farming, which can be used to represent 
a farmer’s age, is not statistically significant. 
 
The positive coefficient for agricultural output value (OUTVALUE) appears to support 
the argument that greater agricultural output enables greater access to materials for 
long-term land improvements. Farm size is negatively and significantly associated 
with long-term land improvements.  This result is not as expected a priori. A larger 
farm would be expected to generate a greater marketed surplus, which could be 
reinvested on the farm. 
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The coefficients for the presence of a river or irrigation facilities on the farm prior to 
acquisition are positive, indicating that these influence further long-term investments 
on the farm.  However, the coefficients are not significant, thus the presence of a 
river or irrigation facilities prior to acquisition does not seem to have any influence on 
subsequent long-term improvements.  
 
The coefficients for the education level of the owner farmer, formal agricultural 
training, access to extension services and credit, access to non-farm income, and 
medium-term investments (i.e. soil conservation) are not significant.  Thus, these 
variables seem not to affect the propensity to make long-term farm investments. 
 
5.2.3 Medium-Term Improvements 
 
To assess the relationship between land tenure security and investment in medium-
term farm improvements, the following econometric model was estimated. 
 
MIDTERM = δ0 + δ1HHEDUC + δ2TRAINING + δ3EXPERIENCE + δ4FARMSIZE + 
δ5TENURE + δ6EXTENSION + δ7CREDIT + δ8NFINCOM + δ9OUTVALUE + 
δ10DRAFT + µ2  
[12] 
Where: 
 
MIDTERM is farmer has mid-term investments, i.e. soil and soil water conservation, 
manuring, (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
HHHEDUC is education level of farm owner (); 
TRAINING is farmer received formal agricultural training (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
EXPERIENCE is number of years farming; 
FARMSIZE is total farm size (ha); 
TENURE is tenure type (1 = freehold, 0 = leasehold); 
EXTENSION is farmer receive agricultural extension services (1 = yes, 0 = 
otherwise); 
CREDIT is farmer has access to credit (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
NFINCOM is non-farm income (Z$??); 
OUTVALUE is value of annual total farm production/output (Z$); 
DRAFT is farmer has access to draft power (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
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The model for medium-term investments in soil improvement has a very good 
predictive record.    The model correctly predicts 94.6% of the dependent variable's 
values on medium-term investments. The model's parameter estimates are 
presented in Table 28. 
  
Contrary to expectations, secure tenure, as in freehold tenure, have an insignificant 
coefficient for this equation.  Thus security of tenure does not seem to affect 
medium-term investments in soil improvements. 
 
Medium-term investments in soil improvement are positively and significantly 
affected by experience in farming and agricultural output.  As experience in farming 
increases, farmers tend to invest in soil improvements.  Similarly, higher agricultural 
output propels an investment in soil improvements. 
 
Table 28: Probit Model Results for Medium-Term Farm Investments  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error b/St.Er.| P[|Z|>z] 
Constant -0.3898632672 1.5448926 -0.252 0.8008 
HHEDUC -0.1891470400 0.30095814 -0.628 0.5297 
TRAINING -3.602291114 1.7173869 -2.098* 0.0359 
EXPERIENCE 0.2423682919 0.12628654 1.919 0.0550 
FARMSIZE -0.01265721365 .34684666E-01 -0.365 0.7152 
TENURE 0.7458434306 0.81562461 0.914 0.3605 
EXTENSION 0.3364876759 1.0036987 0.335 0.7374 
CREDIT 9.823720495 165752.88 0.000 1.0000 
NFINCOM 0.8086335624 0.92471803 0.874 0.3819 
OUTVALUE 0.00003850908266 0.16149534E-04 2.385* 0.0171 
DRAFT -1.253898189 0.82251327 -1.524 0.1274 
*significant at 0.05 and ** significant at 0.01 
 
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
 
        Predicted 
------  ----------  +  ----- 
Actual      0    1  |  Total 
------  ----------  +  ----- 
  0          2      5  |        7 
  1          1  105  |    106 
------  ----------  +  ----- 
Total     3   110 |    113 
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Contrary to a priori expectations, medium-term investments are negatively and 
significantly affected by formal agricultural training.  The result seems to indicate that 
ceteris paribus, farmers with formal agricultural training have a lower probability of 
investing in soil improvements than farmers who did not receive formal agricultural 
training. 
 
The probability of making medium-term investments in soil improvement is not 
significantly affected by the education level of the owner farmer, farm size, and 
access to extension services, access to credit, access to non-farm income, and 
access to draft power for land preparation.  This is indicated by the insignificant 
coefficients for these variables. 
 
5.2.4 Variable Farm Inputs 
 
To assess the relationship between land tenure security and the use of commercial 
farm inputs, the study estimated the following ordinary least squares model: 
 
TVCHA = ∂0 + ∂1HHEDUC + ∂2MIDTERM +  ∂3SEXFARM + ∂4EXTENSION + 
∂5LONGT + ∂6TRAINING + ∂7NFINCOM + ∂8ARABLE + ∂9RELATIVE + µ3 
[13] 
Where: 
 
TVCHA is annual total variable costs per hectare (Z$/ha), 
HHHEDUC is education level of farm owner (); 
MIDTERM is farmer has mid-term investments, i.e. soil and soil water conservation, 
manuring, (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
SEXFARM is sex of farm owner; 
EXTENSION is farmer receive agricultural extension services (1 = yes, 0 = 
otherwise); 
LONGT is farmer has long-term investments, i.e. irrigation infrastructure, buildings, 
paddocks, fencing, (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
TRAINING is farmer received formal agricultural training (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
NFINCOM is non-farm income (Z$); 
ARABLE is total farm arable land (ha); and 
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 RELATIVE is farmer receive money from relatives who live away from the farm (1 = 
yes, 0 = otherwise). 
 
The model estimation for investment in variable inputs show that the included 
explanatory variables account for only 1.5% of the variation in the dependent 
variable (Table 29).  All the included explanatory variables for the level of input use 
per hectare are statistically insignificant.  The only variable with a positive coefficient 
is non-farm income.  As the level of non-farm income increases the farmer is likely to 
have higher input applications per hectare.  The variable for obtaining income from 
relatives is approaching significance and is negative.  Thus farmers who mostly rely 
on relatives for remittances have lower input applications per hectare than farmers 
who are self reliant.  
 
The model results seem to indicate that the level of input use is not significantly 
affected by the level of long-term and medium-term farm investments, the education 
level of owner farmer, sex of owner farmer, access to extension services, access to 
formal agricultural training, and arable land acreage. 
 
Table 29: OLS Model Results for Total Variable Costs per Hectare  
Variable Coefficient T Sig. 
Constant -229442.407 -0.527 0.600 
HHEDUC -21011.179 -0.422 0.674 
MIDTERM 98130.742 0.265 0.792 
SEXFARM 94113.497 0.467 0.642 
EXTENSION 147902.336 0.825 0.412 
LONGT 25001.467 0.082 0.935 
TRAINING 200915.930 1.147 0.255 
NFINCOM 222671.844 1.533 0.129 
ARABLE 2775.922 0.686 0.495 
RELATIVE -207422.738 -1.412 0.162 
    
Adj. R2 1.5%   
F 0.852   
Sig. F 0.571   
*significant at 0.05 and **significant at 0.01 
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5.3 Farm Output and Land Tenure Security 
 
The second major hypothesis of the study is that farms under freehold tenure have 
higher productivity than those under leasehold tenure. Tenure security may enhance 
long-term investments, which in turn enhance yields.  Tenure security provides 
farmers with adequate incentives or means to make land improvements or adopt 
new technologies that could enhance production efficiency (Parsons, 1971).  
 
To test this hypothesis, the study estimated the following ordinary least squares 
model:  
 
YIELDHA = σ0 + σ1HHEDUC + σ2MIDTERM + σ3TVCHA + σ5SEXFARM + σ6PLANT 
+ σ7EXTENSION + σ8LONGT + σ9FARMSIZE + µ4 
[14] 
Where: 
YIELDHA is value of annual total farm production/output per hectare (Z$/ha); 
HHHEDUC is education level of farm owner (); 
MIDTERM is farmer has mid-term investments, i.e. soil and soil water conservation, 
manuring, (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
TVCHA is annual total variable costs per hectare (Z$/ha), 
SEXFARM is sex of farm owner; 
PLANT is farmer has at least a plantation crop (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
EXTENSION is farmer receive agricultural extension services (1 = yes, 0 = 
otherwise); 
LONGT is farmer has long-term investments, i.e. irrigation infrastructure, buildings, 
paddocks, fencing, (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
FARMSIZE is total farm size (ha); 
 
Estimation of the equation for the value of agricultural output per hectare (YIELDHA) 
accounts for 14.3% of the variation in yield (Table 30).  The variables for medium 
and long-term farm investment have insignificant coefficients.  Thus, medium-term 
and long-term investments do not seem to affect farm productivity.  This result is not 
as expected. A priori, both medium-term and long-term investments are expected to 
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positively impact on farm productivity.  Contrary to expectations, the coefficient for 
the level of input use is also statistically insignificant. 
  
Table 30: OLS Model Results for Value of Agricultural Output per Ha (YIELDHA) 
Variable Coefficient T Sig. 
Constant -19191.402 -0.497 0.620 
HHEDUC 7825.869 1.717 0.090 
MIDTERM 12590.820 0.373 0.710 
TVCHA 0.155 0.916 0.362 
SEXFARM 17413.417 0.954 0.343 
PLANT -9612.811 -0.661 0.510 
EXTENSION -33652.846 -2.080 0.041* 
LONGT 10872.322 0.397 0.692 
FARMSIZE 990.587 3.382 0.001** 
    
Adj. R2 14.3%   
F 2.833   
Sig. F 0.008   
*significant at 0.05 and ** significant at 0.01 
 
YIELD is positively and significantly affected by the level of education of owner 
farmer and farm size.  As the level of education of the owner farmer increases, farm 
productivity increases.  A one-year increase in the level of education of the owner 
farmer results in a Z$7825 increase in productivity. 
 
Contrary to expectations, as the farm size increases, farm productivity increases.  A 
priori, as farm size increases, yield is expected to decrease indicating that 
inefficiencies arise in production on larger farms. The results show that a one-
hectare increase in farm size results in a Z$990 increase in the value output per 
hectare.  This might be attributed to the ability of large farm holders to fallow their 
land and they can continually cultivate on land previously under fallow – resulting in 
higher yields.  This might also be attributed to the ability of large land holders to grow 
a diversity of crops – food crops, cash crops, and plantation crops.  This diversity in 
the crops grown results in increased productivity.  However, the presence of 
plantation crops on a farm seems to result in lower productivity as indicated by the 
negative coefficient for the variable PLANT.  However, the coefficient is insignificant. 
 
Contrary to expectations, the coefficient for access to extension services in negative 
and significant.  The result indicates that farmers with access to extension services, 
 72 
ceteris paribus, have a lower productivity of Z$33652 than farmers who do not have 
access to extension services. 
 
5.4 Access to Credit and Land Tenure Security 
 
To assess the relationship between land tenure security and access to seasonal 
credit, the following econometric model was estimated. 
 
CREDIT = δ0 + δ1HHEDUC + δ2AGEHHH + δ3 LONGT + δ4FARMSIZE + δ5TENURE 
+ δ6EXTENSION + δ7PLANT + µ5  
[15] 
Where: 
 
CREDIT is farmer has access to credit (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
HHHEDUC is education level of farm owner; 
TRAINING is farmer received formal agricultural training (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
AGEHHH is age of farm owner; 
LONGT is farmer has long-term investments, i.e. irrigation infrastructure, buildings, 
paddocks, fencing, (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
FARMSIZE is total farm size (ha); 
TENURE is tenure type (1 = freehold, 0 = leasehold); 
EXTENSION is farmer receive agricultural extension services (1 = yes, 0 = 
otherwise); 
PLANT is farmer has at least a plantation crop (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise); 
 
The model for access to credit has a good predictive record for those without access 
to credit.    The model correctly predicts 81.8% of the dependent variable's values on 
access to credit. The model's parameter estimates are presented in Table 31. 
  
As expected a priori, secure tenure, as in freehold tenure, positively and significantly 
affects access to credit.  Thus security of tenure seems to affect access to seasonal 
credit for farm inputs. 
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Table 31: Probit Model Results for Access to Credit 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error b/St.Er. P[IZI]>z] 
Constant -3.661 .495 -7.394*** .000 
TENURE 0.355 .195 1.820* .069 
LONGT .364 .312 1.169 .243 
EXTENSION .262 .245 1.069 .285 
AGEHHH .009 .006 1.618 .106 
FARMSIZE -.007 .006 -1.056 .291 
HHHEDUC -.011 .059 -.192 .848 
PLANT -.155 .179 -.866 .387 
*significant at 0.05 and ** significant at 0.01 
 
 
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
 
        Predicted 
------  ----------  +  ----- 
Actual      0    1  |  Total 
------  ----------  +  ----- 
  0        95    0   |     95 
  1        21    0   |     21 
------  ----------  +  ----- 
Total   116    0 |    116 
 
 
The probability of accessing credit is not significantly affected by the education level 
of the owner farmer, farm size, access to extension services, on-farm long-term 
investments, and whether the farmer has plantation crops or not.  This is indicated 
by the insignificant coefficients for these variables. 
 
5.5 Discussion  
 
This study has shown that the freehold tenure system is associated with a higher 
propensity to (i) make long-term investments in land improvement, (ii) invest in 
plantation crops, and (iii) access credit.  The results for long-term investment and 
plantation crops suggest that land tenure may influence the long view taken by farm 
managers. It should however, be noted that the freehold farms tend to be larger, 
allowing more flexibility with crop choice. In addition, the freeholders are significantly 
different in that age is a barrier to crop production. Plantation crops do reduce the 
problem of peak labour for cropping, this is despite the freeholders generally having 
more broad-scale cultivation equipment. In addition, freeholders are also more likely 
to have woodlots.  
 74 
 
There is also greater investment in permanent housing, even though fewer 
freeholders live on the farm, and some farm improvements such as fencing.  That is, 
there is some evidence that greater tenure security is associated with greater levels 
of long-term investment. While fencing and sheds do contribute to productivity, all 
these investments could also be considered as contributions to the value of the 
asset.  Some of this investment might be explained as contributions to capital gain.  
The increase in long-term investment is not obviously explained by the freehold 
farms being larger, since this investment is negatively correlated with farm size.  On 
the other hand there is some correlation between the long-term investments and 
farm output.   
 
On the other hand and contrary to expectations, the results of this study indicate that 
tenure security may not necessarily result in higher productivity. In particular, tenure 
security appears not to significantly affect medium term soil improvements.  The 
higher output farms tend to have higher investment in such improvements.  Against 
expectations, those with formal training in agriculture are less likely to be investing in 
medium-term improvements. One possible explanation is that those trained in 
agriculture have a strong production focus with an emphasis on the short-term. 
Against that, there appears to be no correlation between training and level of 
investment in variables for production. Instead, yields correlate only with farm size. 
The influence of scale might be explained by the scope that those landholders have 
to rotate production and to select the most suitable areas for crops.  
 
The results of this study are similar to those obtained by Feder and Onchan (1987) 
and Hayes and Roth (1997). Feder and Onchan (1987) investigated the impact of 
land ownership security on farm investment and land improvements in Thailand. 
They found that land-improving investments were significantly affected by ownership 
security, and also that ownership security enhances capital formation by providing 
better incentives and improved access to credit.  Hayes and Roth (1997) on the 
other hand investigated the impacts of different levels of tenure security on farm 
investment, input use, and yield in order to examine the role of tenure security in 
increasing agricultural production.  In their study they found positive relationships 
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between tenure security, the propensity to make long term land improvements, and 
the presence of trees on a plot.  Also long term land improvements were found to 
enhance yield.   These results are similar to the ones obtained by this study as well.  
 
5.6 Conclusions  
 
This chapter examined the determinants of investment, input use, and productivity in 
agriculture under freehold and permit tenure systems in the small-scale farming 
areas of Zimbabwe.  The analyses were based on a set of models, developed from 
the survey data, described in previous chapters. The purpose of this analysis is to 
investigate the effects of tenure security upon farm investments and input use, and 
thereby upon yield. The results of this study help us to identify some important non-
tenure-related determinants of investment, input use, and yields.   
 
The important variable to investing in plantation crop is farm size.  Higher agricultural 
output seems to be associated with a higher propensity to make long-term 
investments in farm buildings, irrigation infrastructure, and paddocks as well as 
medium term investments in soil improvement. Experience in farming is also an 
important determinant in making investments in medium-term soil improvements. 
Contrary to a priori expectations, (i) formal agricultural training is negatively 
associated with medium-term soil investments; and (ii) access to extension services 
is negatively associated with farm productivity.   
 
In relation to the main hypotheses, more secure tenure does seem to correlate with 
some forms of long-term investment, including plantation crops, woodlots and some 
farm structures. There is no obvious connection between more tenure security and 
the medium and short-term investments. Most importantly from the national point of 
view, increasing security of tenure will not necessarily lead to an increase in output.  
 
 76 
CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Summary of the Study 
 
This chapter presents the conclusion of this study. It starts by briefly reviewing the 
research question, the key research issues and the research hypotheses that were 
addressed by this study.  It also gives a brief of the research methodology and gives 
a summary of the main findings of this study. 
 
6.1.1 Research Question 
 
In literature it is often argued that freehold tenure and adequate land are the most 
important pre-conditions for smallholder agriculture development. Development 
specialists often argue that land tenure security is a pre-requisite to increased 
smallholder agricultural productivity and development.  Arguments in favour of 
statutory, individualized land tenure systems (titling) claim that tenure security (1) 
increases credit use through greater incentives for investment, improved 
creditworthiness of projects, and enhanced collateral value of land; (2) increases 
land transactions, facilitating land transfers from less efficient to more efficient users 
by increasing the certainty of contracts and lowering enforcement costs; (3) reduces 
the incidence of land disputes through clearer definition and protection of rights; and 
(4) raises productivity through increased agricultural investment (Feder and Noronha 
1987, Barrows and Roth 1990). The major objective of this study is to identify the 
effects of land tenure security on Small Scale Commercial agricultural productivity 
and development in Zimbabwe.   The research question for this study is:   
Does land tenure security affect farming systems, organization and 
performance among Zimbabwean small scale commercial farmers, and if 
so, how? 
The key research issues or questions for the study are: 
 Does land tenure security affect farm infrastructure development and investment 
amongst SSC farmers in Zimbabwe?  
 Does land tenure security affect SSC farmers’ access to credit? 
 Does land tenure security affect farm productivity amongst SSC farms in 
Zimbabwe?  
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6.1.2 Research Hypotheses 
 
Based on the key research issues outlined above, the hypotheses of the study are: 
 
 Farm infrastructure development is higher for freehold tenure than leasehold 
tenure SSC agriculture.  Thus, farmers with more secure land rights may have a 
higher probability of recouping the benefits from land improvements and thus will 
be more inclined to make medium- or long-term land improvements and to use 
complementary yield-increasing inputs.  In their study on the impact of land 
ownership security on farm investment and land improvements in Thailand, Feder 
and Onchan (1987) found that land-improving investments are significantly 
affected by ownership security.  In two of the three provinces they studied, 
ownership security induces significantly higher capital/land ratios. 
 
 Farmers under freehold tenure have better access to credit than those under 
leasehold tenure.   Land ownership security enhances capital formation by 
providing better incentives and improved access to credit.  Because they imply a 
greater likelihood of repayment, improved tenure security may also increase 
lender willingness to offer credit, leading to easier financing of farm investments 
and inputs. 
 
 Farms under freehold tenure have higher productivity than those under leasehold 
tenure. Tenure security enhances long-term investments, which in turn enhance 
yields.  Tenure security provide farmers with adequate incentives or means to 
make land improvements or adopt new technologies that could enhance 
production efficiency (Parsons, 1971) 
 
6.1.3 Research Design and Methodology 
 
A descriptive research design was chosen for this study.  The descriptive design is 
used because (1) It helps understand the characteristics of a group; (2) It aids in 
thinking systematically about aspects in a given situation; (3) It offers ideas for 
further probing; and (4) It helps make certain decisions (Zikmund, 2000).  The 
descriptive design is closely associated with the positivist paradigm and is also most 
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appropriate for studying the nature of relationships amongst variables.  In this study, 
the primary purpose is to find out the relationship between land tenure security and 
small-scale commercial agriculture performance.   
 
Both secondary and primary data was used for the study.  The main source of 
secondary data was the production data available from the Central Statistical Office 
(CSO), various commodity associations and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA).  
Primary data for the study was collected mainly through a questionnaire (Appendix 
1) that was administered through personal interviews with selected sample farmers. 
A multi-stage sampling strategy was adopted for the study.  The study purposively 
selected, two ICAs which are adjacent thus reducing travel costs.  Within each 
selected ICA, the study selected a 58 percent random sample (57 farm units) of the 
total farm units with permit tenure and 34% (59 farm units) for farm units with 
freehold tenure.  
  
6.1.4 Research Findings and Conclusions  
 
The results of this study indicate that leasehold and freehold properties are 
structurally different, in terms of scale of operation, farm management arrangements, 
crop production practices, animal types, level of mechanization and asset ownership. 
The following chapter looks at whether there is also a difference in investment, use 
of commercial variable inputs and farm productivity.  
  
The majority of farm owners with leasehold tenure are resident farm owners (59.6%), 
whilst the majority of farm owners with freehold tenure are non-resident (61%).  At 
least 74% of the farms under both tenure types are the sole farm managers. About 
15% of the farmers under freehold co-manage the farms with their relatives.   At 
least 74 percent of the farm owners under both types of tenure did not receive any 
formal agricultural training.  The percentage of farmers without any formal training is 
significantly higher for those under leasehold tenure. 
 
Under both tenure systems, the main cropping season for all farmers is summer.  
This is an indicator that none of the farmers have invested in irrigation facilities for 
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dry season cropping.  The results also show that under both tenure systems the level 
of farm mechanization is very low as evidenced by the high use of hand hoes. 
 
Focusing on the effect of tenure security on farm investment, access to credit and 
farm productivity, the following conclusions are drawn from the results: 
• Under secure tenure system farmers are likely to have long-term investments, 
in this case in plantation crops and woodlots. 
• The type of tenure system may not necessarily influence an investment in 
non-fixed assets like livestock. 
• Secure tenure is likely to influence investment in fixed assets like fencing. 
• Secure tenure is likely to positively influence an investment in permanent 
housing facilities but not investment in infrastructure like garages, workshops 
or shades. 
• Secure tenure seems to be associated with a higher propensity to invest in 
improving existing farm infrastructure.  The sources of finance for farm 
infrastructure improvements is mainly from own savings. 
• Access to credit seems to be associated with secure tenure. 
• Remittances from relatives are an important source of short term farm input 
financing and long term farm investments. 
 
Within the small-scale commercial farming sector there exist differing incentives for 
investing in land.  This study has shown that the freehold tenure system is 
associated with a higher propensity to (i) make long-term investments in land 
improvement, and (ii) invest in plantation crops.  However, contrary to expectations, 
the results of this study indicate that tenure security may not necessarily result in 
higher productivity. Tenure security appears not to significantly affect medium term 
soil improvements.  Medium-term and long-term investments on the farm do not 
seem to have any significant impact on the level of input use. 
 
The results of this study help us to identify some important non-tenure-related 
determinants of investment, input use, and yields.  The important variable to 
investing in plantation crop is farm size.  Larger farm sizes are conducive to 
establishing plantation crops.  Higher agricultural output seems to be associated with 
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a higher propensity to make long-term investments in farm buildings, irrigation 
infrastructure, and paddocks as well as medium term investments in soil 
improvement. Experience in farming is also an important determinant in making 
investments in medium-term soil improvements. Contrary to a priori expectations, (i) 
formal agricultural training is negatively associated with medium-term soil 
investments; and (ii) access to extension services is negatively associated with farm 
productivity.   
 
6.2 Contribution of Research to Theory and Practice 
 
The result on the effect of land tenure on long term farm investment in small scale 
commercial agriculture confirm the central argument often put forward by many 
economists in defence of full-fledged private property rights. Economists argue that 
farmers are more willing to invest when they feel more secure in their right or ability 
to maintain long-term use over their land.  Broadly speaking, landowners are 
expected to be both more willing and more able to undertake investment where 
private property rights prevail.  They are more willing to invest for essentially two 
reasons.  First, when farmers feel more secure in their right or ability to maintain 
long-term use over their land, the return to long-term land improvements and 
conservation measures is higher, and they have therefore a greater incentive to 
undertake investments.  Second, when land can be more easily converted to liquid 
assets through sale-that is, when superior transfer rights have the effect of lowering 
the costs of exchange if the land is either rented or sold-, improvements made 
through investment can be better realized, thereby increasing its expected return.  
Investment incentives are again enhanced.  On the other hand, farmers are more 
able to invest because, when freehold titles are established, land acquires collateral 
value and access to credit is easier.  
 
Smallholder agriculture plays a pivotal role in Zimbabwe.  Most households derive 
their livelihood from agriculture.  Hence, the emphasis most governments are placing 
on smallholder agricultural development and commercialization. Despite its 
importance, smallholder agriculture faces a number of constraints.  Smallholder 
agriculture continues to suffer from low investment and declining productivity. 
Productivity account for as low as 3 percent of the annual area planted to principal 
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crops.  Smallholder agriculture is highly undercapitalized and is also not diversified 
and commercialized.  All this is often blamed on insecure land tenure systems that 
exist amongst the smallholder sector. 
 
Past arguments for freehold tenure for the smallholder sector in Zimbabwe were 
often based on economic theory and a few studies done in other countries.  The 
results of this study provide a useful guide to policy makers and practitioners in 
reforming the existing land tenure arrangements that currently exist amongst 
smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe today.  The results are important as they also offer 
a guide to the establishment of an appropriate land tenure system for newly resettled 
farmers in Zimbabwe who are currently farming under a very insecure leasehold 
tenure system.   
 
6.3 Limitations of the Study 
 
In carrying out this study, it is acknowledged that there are other factors that affect 
productivity that this study may not have captured within the available time.  Another 
possible limitation of the study could result from the sampling strategy.  A problem 
may arise with cluster sampling if the characteristics and attitudes of the farmers 
within the cluster are too similar. Increasing the number of clusters for the study and 
reducing the number of farms selected within a cluster may mitigate this problem. 
 
Farmers may also have problems in recalling past production data.  They may also 
not be willing to share their farm production data and they may under report on the 
various activities.  This problem was addressed by fully explaining to the sample 
farmers the purpose of the study, by ensuring maximum confidentiality and also by 
respecting the respondent’s right to privacy.  
 
6.4 Directions for Future Research 
 
Future research based on the focus of this study could focus on the following 
research areas: 
a) Further work on the determinants of farm productivity including the effect of 
tenure security; 
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b) The effect of tenure security on farm fragmentation; and 
c) The relationship between tenure security, farm diversification, and the 
extent of small scale farm commercialization. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Results of this study show that under secure tenure system farmers are likely to 
have long-term production investments and some fixed assets like fencing and 
woodlots. Secure tenure is likely to positively influence access to credit and 
investment in permanent housing facilities.  These results are quite important as they 
may guide agricultural practitioners in the Southern African region in finding 
appropriate land tenure systems for newly resettled farmers under the various 
agrarian reform programmes being implemented in the region. 
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APPENDIX 1: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
  
 
 HOUSEHOLD LEVEL SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
 Project for the Analysis of Land Tenure Security and Small Scale  
 Commercial Agriculture Performance in the  
 Republic of Zimbabwe 
 
 Small Scale Commercial 
 Farm Sector 
 Survey 
  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Good morning/afternoon.  My name is Lighton Dube, and I am currently studying for 
a Doctorate degree in Business Administration with the University of Southern 
Queensland, in Australia.  As part of my study, I am currently carrying out a study on 
Land Tenure Security and Small Scale Commercial Agriculture Performance in 
Zimbabwe.  The purpose of this study is to investigate whether and how different 
land tenure conditions affect farming systems, organisation and performance among 
Zimbabwean small scale commercial farmers. Four small scale commercial farming 
areas, namely XXXXXX have been selected for this study.  From these four small 
scale commercial farming areas, a ten percent random sample of farms have been 
selected and I am now in the process of discussing with farmers like you to get 
information on the operations of the farm and on the constraints that you have 
encountered so far as farmers.  This information is confidential and will only be 
used by myself to produce my dissertation which will not make reference by name to 
any one farm or farmer.  Our discussion will be guided by a questionnaire.  I will be 
grateful if you could assist me in filling out this questionnaire in as honest a manner 
as possible.  
 
 
Questionnaire No. ___________ District:___________ 
 
Enumerator Name:___________ ICA:______________ 
 
Date of Interview:_____________ Farm:______________ 
 
ICA Natural Region:_____________ 
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SECTION A: Demographic questions for head of household, 
spouse, and other household members 
 
 
1) Are you the registered farm owner? 
1. Yes 
2.  No 
 
2) Sex of registered farm owner  
 1.  Male 
  
 2.  Female 
 
3) Are you the sole manager of the farm, or do you co-manage the farm? 
 1.  Sole manager 
 2.  Co-manager with _____________ (relation) 
 
4) In what year did you begin to manage (or co-manage) the farm?________ 
 
5) Please complete this table for all family members (including children) currently 
residing in your household. 
 
No Relationship to 
head of household 
Sex 
1=M 
2=F 
Age Education 
level 
Occupation Full (1) or Part-
time (2) on 
farm? No work 
on farm = 0 
1.       
2.       
3.       
4.       
5.       
6.       
7.       
8.       
9.       
10.       
 
 
6) Does farm owner have any formal agricultural training?  
1.  Yes, please specify____________________  
2.  No 
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SECTION B   Information on land holding 
 
 
 
7) How many hectares comprise your farm? ___________ ha 
 
Total arable  ________________ ha 
 
Total grazing  ________________ ha 
 
Others, please  ________________ ha 
 
 
8) Please complete the following table on your land holding. 
 
Year 
acquired 
Size 
(ha) 
Topograp
hy 
1=flat 
2=hilly 
3=mtnous 
Form of 
acquisition 
1=purchase 
2=inherit 
3=gift 
4=lease 
5=Others 
Price 
(ZWD) 
Method 
of 
financing 
1=credit 
2=cash 
3=kind 
4=remit 
Type of 
document 
1=Informal 
lease 
2= Permit 
3=Formal 
lease 
4=Title deed 
       
       
       
 
9) Have you sold or permanently transferred any of your holdings to other farmers in 
the past 10 years? 
 1.  Yes 
 2.  No 
 
 
10) If ‘Yes’, please complete this table for all land that you have sold or permanently 
transferred to other users. 
 
Land 
in ha 
Form of 
acq’tion 
1=purchase 
2=inherit 
3=gift 
4=lease 
5=Others 
Year of 
transfer 
Form of 
transfer 
1=sale 
2=inherit 
3=gift 
4=lease 
5=Others 
Document 
used 
1=Informal 
lease 
2= Permit 
3=Formal 
lease 
 
Price 
(ZWD) 
Transaction 
Cost 
(ZWD) 
Reason 
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11If you inherited your farm, did you inherit the entire farm from your parents? 
 1.  Yes 
2.  No 
 
12If ‘No’, how was your parent’s original farm divided? 
 
 Relation  Size of holding inherited 
 
 Self   _____________ ha 
 
 __________  _____________ ha 
 
 __________  _____________ ha 
 
13) Have you leased out land in 2005? 
 
14) If ‘Yes’,  
 
 a)  How much? _________ ha 
 
 b)  At what price? _________ ZWD/ha 
 
 c)  How long have you rented out this land? _________ 
 
15) To whom have you leased the land? 
 
a)  From the State. __________ ha 
 
 b)  From a private farmer. _________ ha 
 
  c)  Other. ___________ ha 
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SECTION C   Information on farm structure and land use 
 
 
16) Did you cultivate the total area of overall arable area in 2005? 
 1.  Yes 
 2.  No 
 
17) If 'No', what are the reasons for not cultivating this land? (circle all that apply) 
 a)  Lack of labour 
 b)  Old age 
 c)  Lack of inputs to plant the total area. 
 d)  Lack of draft power 
 e)  Sickness 
 f)   Fallow land as part of crop rotations 
 g)  Others (Specify) 
 
18) How do you prepare your land?  (Circle all that apply) 
a)  Hire tractor 
b)  Use own tractor 
c)  Hire draft power 
d)  Use hoes  
e)  Use own cattle/donkeys 
f)  Others (Specify) 
 
19) Which is you main cropping season? 
1.  Summer  
2.  Winter   
3.  Both summer and winter 
 
20) What is/are the principal enterprises? 
 ___________________ 
 ___________________ 
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SECTION D   Plantation Crops and Other Tress 
 
25) Do you grow any plantation crops?  
 1.  Yes
  
 2.  No 
 
26) If ‘Yes’, give details for the year 2005. 
 
Crop Area 
planted 
Who 
established 
it 
When 
established? 
Establishment 
costs 
Maintenance 
costs 
Annual 
production 
       
       
       
  
 
SECTION E   Information on livestock and other capital holdings 
 
27) What were your livestock holdings for the year 2005? 
 
A. Number of oxen and cattle 
 1)  Calves  _________ 
 2)  Oxen  __________ 
 3)  Steers  _________ 
 4)  Heifers  _________ 
 5   Cows  __________ 
  TOTAL  ___________ 
 
B. Number of pigs 
 1)  Sucklings  _________ 
 2)  pigs  __________ 
 TOTAL  ___________ 
 
C. Number of sheep and goats 
 1)  lambs  _________ 
 2)  Sheep  __________ 
 3)  baby goat  _________ 
 4)  goats  _________ 
 TOTAL  ___________ 
 
 D.  Donkeys and horses  ________ 
 
 E.  Poultry  ____________ 
 
 F.  Milk production in litres  __________ 
 
 G.  Egg production  ___________ 
 102
28) How has this stock varied over the last 5 years? 
 1.  Stock has been reduced. 
 2.  Stock has been increased. 
 3.  Stock has  stayed the same. 
 
29) Do you use livestock for farm work? (circle all that apply) 
 1.  Traction. 
 2.  Transportation. 
 3.  No livestock used for farm work. 
 
30) What are the major livestock enterprises for the farm? 
 
Enterprise 
 
Size 
 
Annual off 
take 
 
Annual sales 
 
Annual costs 
of production 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31) Which types of mechanization do you own, and how many pieces? 
 
Name of Asset 
 
Number owned 
 
Estimate total value at 
present  
 
Plough 
 
 
 
 
 
Cultivator 
 
 
 
 
 
Planter 
 
 
 
 
 
Harrows 
 
 
 
 
 
Maize sheller 
 
 
 
 
 
Maize grinder 
 
 
 
 
 
Hoe 
 
 
 
 
 
Tractor 
 
 
 
 
 
Cart 
 
 
 
 
 
Bicycle 
 
 
 
 
 
Vehicle (Specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
Others 
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32) Do you rent or borrow equipment? 
 1.  Yes 
 2.  No 
 
33) If ‘Yes’,  
 a)  What type ____________ 
 b)  From whom ___________ 
 c)  At what price __________ 
 
34) Is the farm fenced?   
 1.  Yes  
 2.  No 
 
 104
35) If ‘Yes’, what is the type of fencing? 
1.  Boundary fencing only 
2.  Boundary and paddocks 
3.  Paddocks only 
 
36) What animal handling facilities has the farm developed? ______________ 
 
 
37) Type of main farm homestead. 
 
 
Type 
 
Size/Rooms 
 
Estimated value 
 
Pole and dagga 
 
 
 
 
 
Brick under asbestos 
 
 
 
 
 
Brick under grass 
 
 
 
 
 
Brick under tiles 
 
 
 
 
 
Others 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38) What are the other housing structures that have been developed by the farmer? 
_____________________________________ 
 
39) Of the total arable area, what hectarage is potentially irrigable? ________ 
 
40) What area has been developed for irrigation? _____________ 
 
41) Which of the following water sources are found on the farm? 
1.  River    
2.  Dam 
3.  Stream   
4.  Boreholes 
5.  Well 
 
42) Does the farm has piped water?  
 1.  Yes  
 2.  No 
 
43) If yes, what is the source of the piped water? _______________ 
 
 
44) Does the farm has a woodlot?  
 1.  Yes  
 2.  No 
 
45) If yes, what is the size of the woodlot? ____________ 
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SECTION F  Information on farm planning 
 
 
46) Have you made any improvements and/or changes to your land?  (circle all that 
apply) 
 a)  Improved irrigation. 
 b)  Improved drainage. 
 c)  Improved borders 
 d)  Contour ridges 
 e)  Planted trees 
 f)  Buildings 
 g)  Fences 
 h)  No improvements 
 
47) How did you finance these improvements? 
 a)  Credit 
 b)  Savings 
 c)  Other __________ 
 
48) Do you currently have access to credit? 
 1.  Yes 
 2.  No 
 
49) If ‘Yes’, from whom do you borrow?  __________ 
 
50) If ‘Yes’, at what interest rate? _____________ 
 
51) Have you borrowed money during the last five seasons to finance any of your 
farm operations? 
 1.  Yes 
 2.  No 
 
 
 
 
52) If ‘Yes’, state how much has been borrowed and for what use? 
 
 
Season 
 
Amount 
borrowed 
 
Use 
 
Interest rate 
 
Repayment 
period 
 
2005/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002/2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001/2002 
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53) If farmer has not used credit during the last five seasons, what are the 
reasons?___ 
 
54) What were the requirements for applying for the credit? _____________ 
 
55) Is credit readily available when needed?  
 1.  Yes
  
 2.  No 
 
56) Do you receive money from relatives who live away from the farm? 
1.  Yes   
2.  Yes 
 
 
57) If any relatives send or bring back money, how often do they send it back to the 
farm?  ________ 
 
58) Do you have access to extension services? 
1.  Yes 
2.  No 
 
59) If ‘Yes’, from whom? (circle all that apply) 
 1.  AREX 
 2.  Private 
 3.  Farmer Association/Organisation 
 4.  Input suppliers 
 5.  Other _______________ 
 
60) If ‘Yes’, what type? (circle all that apply) 
 1.  Seed inputs 
 2.  Breeding 
 3.  Marketing information 
 4.  Crop planning information 
 5.  Government agricultural policy information 
 6.  Other _____________ 
61) Are there other agricultural services that you receive from the public sector? 
_________________ 
 
62) Where do you get the information that enables you to plan your crop pattern?  
(circle all that apply) 
 a)  Agricultural cooperative 
 b)  Extension service 
 c)  Private traders 
 d)  Fellow farmers 
e)  Family tradition 
f)   Own marketing experience 
g)  Mass media 
h)  Other  ______________ 
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63) How many members of your household earn money from wage employment or 
from running a business (including handicrafts and brewing)?  __________  
 
64) What are your main sources of labour? 
a)  Permanent labour  __________ 
b)  Casual (seasonal) labour  ______ 
 
65) How does the farmer acquire his inputs? 
 1.  Cash 
 2.  Credit 
3.  Other ________ 
 
66) If farmer acquires inputs on credit, what are the credit requirements? 
__________ 
 
 
SECTION G  CONSTRAINTS 
 
67) What are the major constraints you face in your farming activities? 
_______________ 
 
68) Would you prefer a different land tenure to what you now have? 
1.  Yes   
2.  No 
 
69) If ‘Yes’, what tenure? __________________ 
 
70) If ‘Yes’, explain why? ___________________ 
 
71) Is there anything else that you would like to add? 
 
 
Finishing Time in Hours _______________ 
 
 Once again, thank you for taking your time to assisting me in filling in this questionnaire 
 
